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FEAR, RISK AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: 
UNRAVELING THE "CHILLING EFFECT"t 
FREDERICK ScHAUER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It has been twenty-six years since the Supreme Court introduced the word 
"chill" in a first amendment case,' and nearly sixteen years since the phrase 
"chilling effect" made its debut. 2 In that time, the concept of the chilling 
effect has grown from an emotive argument into a major3 substantive 
component of first amendment adjudication. Its use accounts for some very 
significant advances in free speech theory, and, in fact, the chilling effect 
doctrine underlies the resolution of many cases in which it is neither ex-
pressed nor clearly implied.4 
The chilling effect concept has been recognized most frequently and 
articulated most clearly in decisions chiefly concerned with the procedural 
aspects of free speech adjudication. 5 The possibility that the existence of an 
unconstitutional state statute might inhibit the exercise of first amendment 
freedoms was the primary justification for those decisions establishing a 
more receptive approach to affirmative federal court litigation contesting 
the validity of such legislation. 6 Similarly, the potential deterrent effect of a 
vague, or more commonly, an overbroad statute, was seen as reason enough 
to bend traditional rules of standing-a litigant would be allowed to attack 
such a statute, even though his own conduct could validly be proscribed by a 
legislative enactment more narrowly and clearly drafted. 7 The current Su-
t © 1978 by Frederick Schauer. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Marshall- Wythe School of Law, College of William and 
Mary. A.B. 1967, M.B.A. 1968, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1972, Harvard Law School. 
1 
"Such unwarranted inhibition ... has an unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of 
the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice; it makes for caution 
and timidity in their associations by potential teachers." Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 
195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
2 While, of course, all legitimate organizations are the beneficiaries of these protections, 
they are all the more essential here, where the challenged privacy is that of persons 
espousing beliefs already unpopular with their neighbors and the deterrent and "chill-
ing" effect on the free exercise of constitutionalfy enshrined rights of free speech, 
expressio'n, and association is consequently the more immediate and substantial. 
Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1963). See also Freed-
man v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 60-61 (1965); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,487,494 
(1965). 
3 Even by 1967, Mr. Justice Harlan noted that the chilling effect doctrine had become 
"ubiquitous." Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 256 n.2 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
4 See note 42 infra. 
5 For a discussion and analysis of these cases, see generally Note, The Chilling Effect in 
Constitutional Law, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 808 (1969); Note, The First Amendment Over-
breadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844 (1970). 
•• 
6 
· The leading case is, of course, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 4 79 (1965). See, e.g., 
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 ( 1967). For a general discussion of the Court's work in this 
area, see generally Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The 
Significance of Dombrowski, 48 Tex. L. Rev. 535 (1970); Note, supra note 5, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 
808. 
7 Again, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 4 79 ( 1965), is the seminal case, although traces 
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preme Court, however, has closed many of the doors to comprehensive and 
aggressive federal adjudication of first amendment claims previously 
opened by the above-mentioned procedural mechanisms. 8 And, in so doing, 
the Court has lessened the importance of the chilling effect as the key to the 
federal courthouse in free speech cases. Consequently, the procedural as-
pects of this doctrine, even had they not been adequately dealt with else-
where,9 would now provide little reason for extended commentary. 
On the other hand, the importance of the substantive use of the chilling 
effect doctrine remains undiminished by recent events. If anything, its 
significance has grown as the procedural consequences of "chilling" have 
been minimized. It is true that the first amendment cases10 that now appear 
can be found as early as Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940). See, e.g., Gooding 
v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 
(1971); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 
415, 432-33 ( 1963). For commentary dealing with the background, development and impact 
of the overbreadth doctrine, see generally Torke, The Future of First Amendment Over-
breadth, 27 Vand. L. Rev. 289 (1974); Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 
Harv. L. Rev. 423 (1974); Note, supra note 5, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844; Note, Over-
breadth Review and the Burger Court, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 532 (1974); Comment, The First 
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine: A Comparison of Dellinger and Baranski, 65 J. Crim. L. 
192 (1974); 45 U. Colo. L. Rev. 361 (1974). 
8 The rejection of the Dombrowski principle is attributable to a line of cases commencing 
with Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal court must abstain from enjoining state 
prosecution under vague or overbroad statute). See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 
(1975); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975); 
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); 
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). But the Dombrowski principle has not completely 
vanished from the scene. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (thrice-prosecuted 
Jehovah's Witness entitled to injunction prohibiting enforcement of state statute requiring 
display of motto "Live Free or Die" on license plate); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 
(1974) (failure to demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances" does not preclude declaratory 
relief against threatened but non-pending state prosecution for distribution of handbills in 
violation of trespass statute). See generally Bartels, Avoiding a Comity of Errors: A Model for 
Adjudicating Federal Civil Rights Suits that "Interfere" with State Civil Proceedings, 29 Stan. 
L. Rev. 27 (1976); Fiss,Dombrowski, 86 Yale L.J. 1103 (1977); Laycock, Federal Interference 
with State Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective Relief, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 193; Maraist, 
Federal Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski, Younger and Beyond, 50 
Tex. L. Rev. 1324 (1972); Sedler, Dombrowski in the Wake of Younger: The View From 
Without and Within, 1972 Wis. L. Rev. I; Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and 
Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1274-1330 (1977); Note, Younger Grows Older: Equitable 
Abstention in Civil Proceedings, 50 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 870 (1975). 
Although the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines retain more life than Dombrowski, they 
too are rapidly weakening. See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 773 (1977) ("The statute is not 
vague as applied to Ward's conduct"); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977) 
(reluctance to apply overbreadth analysis in area of commercial speech); Young v. American 
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 58-59 (1976) ("For even if there may be some uncertainty 
about the effect of the ordinances on other litigants, they are unquestionably applicable to 
these respondents"); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-15 (1973) (where conduct 
and not just speech is involved, the overbreadth must be both real and substantial); Laird v. 
Tatum, 408 U.S. I, II (1972). See generally Note, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.: 
Creating Levels of Protected Speech, 4 Hastings Const. L.Q. 321, 327-37 (1977). Ste also 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 98 S. Ct. 1912, 1922 n.20 (1978). 
9 See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 710-24 ( 1978); Note, supra note 5, 69 Colum. 
L. Rev. 808. See also the authorities cited at notes 7-8 supra. 
1° Chilling effect reasoning has some application to constitutional law outside the first 
amendment. See Note, supra note 5, 69 Colum. L. Rev. at 832-40. In addition, the chilling effect 
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before the courts generally differ in subject matter from the "subversive" 
cases of the 1950's and early '60's in which chilling effect reasoning was first 
utilized. 11 Nevertheless, the doctrine has not lost its vitality; it still figures 
prominently in the resolution of myriad cases across the spectrum of free 
speech problems. Of greater significance, however, is the fact that the 
chilling effect concept lies at the core of the Court's so-called "categoriza-
tion" approach, the definitional balancing technique used to formulate 
categorical rules differentiating between speech protected by the first 
amendment and speech subject to governmental restriction and regula-
tion.12 A close look at the Court's treatment of defamation, obscenity and 
incitement reveals the critical role that the chilling effect doctrine has played 
in determining where the lines of privilege marking the boundaries of those 
categories are to be drawn, and in explaining why the lines must be drawn at 
those particular points. 13 
This broad effect is by no means surprising, since the chilling effect 
doctrine is but the logical combination of two simple yet fundamental prop-
ositions. First, it must be recognized that all litigation, and indeed the entire 
legal process, is surrounded by uncertainty. The interplay of human wit-
nesses, jurors, judges and lawyers coupled with the imprecision of 
"people-made" rules guarantees that there will be little in the realm of 
litigation of which we can be sure; thus, the ability to predict accurately the 
outcome of any adversary confrontation is by no means a process in which we 
can maintain a high degree of confidence. 14 Given this overriding uncer-
tainty, errors of different kinds can occur. In the criminal context, one of the 
more obvious errors is the wrongful conviction of the innocent; the converse 
doctrine has been employed in areas where no constitutional interests are implicated. Labor 
law provides the best example. /d. at 808 n.2. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Darlington 
Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 275 (1965). While the analysis proposed and developed in this article 
may be successfully applied in a variety of contexts, the focus here is restricted to problems 
peculiar to the first amendment. All further references to something being "chilled" are 
directed towards activity arguably protected by the freedoms of speech, press and associa-
tion. 
11 See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 556-57 ( 1963); 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 
137-38 ( 1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); Sweezy 
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 246-50 (1957); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 
(1952) (Frankfurter,]., concurring). See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433-34 (1963); 
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 
462-63 ( 1958). 
12 For a brief yet informative discussion of the Court's categorization technique, see 
generally L. Tribe, supra note 9, at 602-08. In addition, see Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case 
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1482 (I 975). 
13 See notes 90-204 and accompanying text infra. 
14 In this respect, I believe it clear that the origin of the chilling effect doctrine must be 
attributed to Jerome Frank. His "fact-skepticism," which draws attention to the causes and 
effects of error and uncertainty in the litigation process, provides the doctrinal predicate for 
all that is to follow. See J. Frank, Courts on Trial (1949); J. Frank, Law and the Modern 
Mind (1930); Frank, "Short of Sickness and Death": A Study of Moral Responsibility in 
Legal Criticism, 26 N.Y. U.L. Rev. 545 (1951). See also Cahn, Fact-Skepticism and Fundamen-
tal Law, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. I (1958). 
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error is, of course, the wrongful acquittal of the guilty. Similarly, in civil 
litigation, there can be an erroneous judgment in favor of an undeserving 
plaintiff, or an erroneous judgment against a plaintiff with a meritorious 
claim. 15 
Recognition of this potential for error is, however, only the first step. As 
anyone who has survived an elementary course in statistics or decision theory 
will recall, it is also necessary to determine which type of error is the more 
serious or harmful.1 6 It is the need for this determination, placed in the 
context of the first amendment, that leads to the second fundamental prop-
osition underlying the chilling effect doctrine-that an erroneous limitation 
of speech has, by hypothesis, more social dis utility than an erroneous overex-
tension of freedom of speech. The wrongful limitation is, a priori, the more 
serious error. This principle of comparative harm may be expressed by 
saying that the first amendment represents a "transcendent value" 17 or by 
defining free speech as the most preferred of the preferred freedoms; 18 at 
any rate, there emerges in our society a recognition of the preeminence of 
the first amendment and freedom of speech. But this is more than the basis 
for a Fourth of july oration; it represents an ordering of values mandated by 
the existence of the first amendment within a legal system characterized by 
error and uncertainty. 19 
Simply stated then, the chilling effect doctrine recognizes the fact that the 
legal system is imperfect and mandates the formulation of legal rules that 
reflect our preference for errors made in favor of free speech. If these two 
basic notions are kept in mind, the chilling effect may be seen not as the 
non-conceptual generalization which it has been called,20 but rather as a 
specific substantive doctrine lying at the very heart of the first amendment. 
After first proposing a definition, this article will attempt to unravel the 
chilling effect concept by isolating its two m<tior components-the recogni-
tion of uncertainty and the principle of comparative harm. The article will 
then discuss the critical role that the chilling effect doctrine has played in the 
formulation of the rules of privilege defining the categories of defamation, 
obscenity and incitement. Further, it will be demonstrated that full appreci-
ation of the chilling effect concept calls for a reevaluation of the first 
amendment doctrine of prior restraint. Finally, this article will argue that, 
while it is true that there are behavioral assumptions that provide the basis 
15 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
16 The statistician, by convention, calls the more serious error the Type I error, and the 
less serious the Type II error. In the legal system, the selection and institution of various 
rules and procedures often reflect a societal evaluation of the comparative frequency and 
harm of the different possible errors. See Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding 
Process, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 1065 (1968); Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in 
the World of John Mitchell, 56 Va. L. Rev. 371 (1970). See also notes 72-90 and accompany-
ing text infra. 
17 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). 
18 See Cahn, The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 Yale L.J. 464 (1956); McKay, The 
Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1182 (1959). 
19 See notes 46-73 and accompanying text infra. 
20 Note, supra note 5, 69 Colum. L. Rev. at 808. 
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for chilling effect analysis, the lack of any ability to quantify or test these 
assumptions does not diminish the significance of the chilling effect as a 
substantive doctrine. The doctrine flows from the relationship between our 
recognition of the inevitability of error and our preference for a particular 
type of error; and it is the existence of this relationship, rather than the 
scientific accuracy of the predictions of human behavior, which justifies the 
formulation of substantive rules in this area. 
II. THE CoMPONENTS OF THE CHILLING EFFECT 
A. The Chilling Effect Defined 
Hoping that the quick-witted reader will have patience with a somewhat 
ponderous writer, I propose to start with the simplest ideas in analyzingjust 
what we call a "chilling effect." There is a tendency fbr the term to be so 
loosely employed that meticulous dissection and clarification are justified. 
The very essence of a chilling effect is an act of deterrence. 21 While one 
would normally say that people are deterred, it seems proper to speak of an 
activity as being chilled. The two concepts go hand in hand, of course, in that 
an activity is chilled if people are deterred from participating in that activity. 
Although an individual's decision not to engage in certain behavior may be 
influenced by a wide range of stimuli, in law the acknowledged basis of 
deterrence is the fear of punishment-be it py fine, imprisonment, imposi-
tion of civil liability, or deprivation of governmental benefit.22 Thus, it is 
apparent that an individual may be deterred or an activity chilled by the 
threatened operation of virtually any penal statute or by the potential appli-
cation of any civil sanction. Indeed, these regulating rules are designed to 
have this precise effect. The penalty for homicide is expected to deter people 
from murdering, thus ideally "chilling" that violent and harmful activity. 23 
And, although deterrence is not a universally recognized g9al of the law of 
torts, it is still to be hoped that the imposition of civil liability for damages 
resulting from the negligent handling of an automobile will deter people 
from driving carelessly, thus chilling such socially harmful activity. This 
broad and desirable conception of chilling, however, entails none of the 
21 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965); Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investigation 
Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1963). 
22 The ill-fated right-privilege distinction reflected a general failure to recognize the 
potential deterrent effect caused by the penalty of withdrawal. or denial of governmental 
benefits. Losing one's job on account of political beliefs is no less a punishment than being 
fined for holding those beliefs, and the threat of loss of employment is no less effective a 
deterrent than the threat of a monetary fine. It was predictable that the very same cases that 
marked the erosion of the right-privilege distinction would also be among the first to 
emphasize the notion of deterrence. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 
597-604 (1967); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 353 U.S. 252, 262, 273 (1957); Slochower 
v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). For a 
general discussion, see VanAlstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Con-
stitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439 (1968); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1595 (1960). 
23 See generally W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law 23 (1972). 
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pejorative connotations of the "chilling effect" concept as it is used in first 
amendment analysis. 24 
In fact, this comprehensive view of the chilling effect may be applicable 
where speech, broadly defined, is the regulated activity, but where there 
exists no constitutional barrier preventing such regulation. Thus, it may be 
that the fear of punishment generated by federal and state obscenity laws 
chills the distribution of hard-core pornography. However, since hard-core 
pornography, as defined in Miller v. California, 25 is not deemed to be con-
stitutionally protected,26 any chilling effect of this nature is permissible, 
and indeed, the intended result of the regulatory measures involved. Simi-
larly, the existence of a civil damage remedy for injury caused by the 
malicious publication of defamatory falsehood is expected to deter individ-
uals from publishing such defamatory material. Again, these utterances are 
unprotected by the first amendment, 27 and thus the possible imposition of 
civil liability creates another example of what I would term a benign chilling 
effect-an effect caused by the intentional regulation of speech or other 
activity properly subject to governmental control. Used in this sense, the 
chilling effect on speech is but a subset of the inhibitory effect created by any 
regulatory enactment and creates no independent constitutional difficulties. 
What we are looking for then is not this benign deterrence, but rather some 
sort of invidious chilling of constitutionally protected activity. This can occur 
not only when activity shielded by the first amendment is implicated, but also 
when any behavior safeguarded by the Constitution is unduly discouraged. 
Consider, for example, the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. The evil of permitting the prosecution to comment upon a 
24 See note I 0 supra. 
2
" 413 u.s. 15 (1973). 
26 See id.; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 
u.s. 476 (1957). 
Throughout this article I assume the validity of the so-called "two-level" theory by which 
obscenity is deemed unprotected by the first amendment because it is not speech. See Kalven, 
The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. I. I have previously discussed 
my views on this approach· to obscenity. Schauer, Reflections on "Contemporary Community 
Standards": The Perpetuation of an Irrelevant Concept in the Law of Obscenity, 56 N.C. 
L. Rev. I ( 1978); Schauer, The Return of Variable Obscenity?, 28 Hastings L.J. 1275 (1977). 
To inject that controversy into this article would unnecessarily clutter the analysis here 
offered. 
·More generally, while I refrain from entering the debate surrounding the question 
whether categorizing or balancing is the proper judicial method of resoiving first amend-
ment questions, see Ely, supra note 12, there is implicit in this article a preference for the 
definitional rather than the ad hoc approach. Although much of the analysis proposed in 
this article, particularly the discussion of the principle of comparative harm, see notes 72-90 
and accompanying text infra, could be successfully applied as a guide to ad hoc balancing, 
the problems presented by the chilling effect can best be resolved by balancing at the 
rule-making level. Ad hoc balancing is based necessarily upon the assumption that an ideal 
balance on the facts of a particular case is possible; however, the inevitability of uncertainty 
denies this possibility. See notes 46-73 and accompanying text infra. A categorizati<'n or 
definitional approach is better suited to ensuring the formulation of rules of consistent 
application that adequately recognize and compensate for both the comparative frequency 
and severity of the errors that are bound to arise in our legal system. 
27 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-42 (1974). 
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defendant's failure to take the stand is that such comment is likely to deter 
the defendant from exercising his right to remain silent.28 This governmen-
tal interference with an activity protected by the Constitution is therefore 
prohibited.29 However, the chilling effect is peculiarly a first amendment 
doctrine, 30 and a comparison of the privilege against self-incrimination with 
the right of free speech may be instructive in demonstrating just why this 
is so. 
It is possible to view certain activity as receiving constitutional protection 
as a result of a societal consensus that such activity is positively advantageous 
and ought to be encouraged; on the other hand, certain behavior may 
receive constitutional immunity from governmental control only because of 
the dangers inherent in state intervention. The privilege against self-
incrimination can possibly be seen as falling within this latter category. It is 
not self-incrimination per se which is "bad," but rather self-incrimination 
resulting from the compulsion of the state which is to be feared. 31 If, despite 
the fifth and fourteenth amendments, all criminal defendants freely took 
the witness stand, it is not clear that society would be the loser. In any event, 
we certainly do not try to prevent a defendant from testifying; we only 
attempt to ensure that his choice is uncoerced. Freedom of speech, however, 
appears to be a somewhat different type of "right." Free speech is an 
affirmative value32-we are concerned with encouraging speech almost as 
much as with preventing its restriction by the government. 33 And, although 
an Hohfeldian analysis would reveal that the freedom to speak implies the 
freedom not to speak, we promote the former because of the overall societal 
benefit that is presumed to flow from the uninhibited exercise of first 
amendment freedoms. 34 If, despite the first amendment, no one was willing 
to discuss public issues, express new opinions, or exchange ideas and infor-
mation, society would no doubt suffer. 35 Since deterrence is of greatest 
28 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-14 (1965). 
29 /d. 
30 See note 10 supra. 
31 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-14 (1965). 
32 Some support, albeit weak, for the distinction drawn between the interests protected by 
the first and fifth amendments is provided by the initial reluctance of the Court to charac-
terize the privilege against self-incrimination as "fundamental." See Adamson v. California, 
332 U.S. 46 (1946). 
33 Our desire to encourage speech may at times conflict with the goal of preventing the 
restriction of free expression by the government. In these instances the Court has treated 
the latter as a preferred goal. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 
( 1974); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94 ( 1973). The 
suggestion made here, that free speech ought to be cultivated, should not be understood as 
indicating any disagreement with the resolution of those cases. See Schauer, Hudgens v. 
NLR.B and the Problem of State Action in First Amendment Adjudication, 61 Minn. L. 
Rev. 433 (1977). For a further discussion of the positive virtues of free speech as opposed to 
the negative consequences of governmental regulation, see generally note 35 infra. 
34 See notes 43-46 and accompanying text infra. 
35 I do not mean to imply that in every instance speech is to be favored over silence; 
however, in the long run, a society marked by a proliferation of speech is generally 
preferable to one typified by a lack of communication. Free speech theorists may possibly be 
divided into two main groups--those who contend that speech is an affirmative value and 
those who argue only that government interference with free expression is detrimental. 
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concern when it is a desirable activity that is being stifled, the potential 
chilling effect of governmental regulation is most invidious where the un-
derlying con~~itutionally protected activity is positively advantageous, rather 
than an activity which, for other reasons, ought to be shielded from state 
intrusion. 36 The first amendment is not the sole constitutional provision 
that can be interpreted as granting affirmative rights,37 and it might be 
possible to apply chilling effect reasoning to any "positive" guarantee. But 
when one speaks of chilling, it is generally the first amendment which comes 
to mind; and, in the interest of precision and to ensure continuity between 
the case law and the analysis here presented, this article will proceed by 
discussing the chilling effect doctrine exclusively in the context of that 
constitutional guarantee. 
Simply restricting the "chilling" concept to protected speech, however, 
does not sufficiently narrow the issue. A statute making criminal the 
publication of the collected works of Shakespeare, an ordinance prohibit-
ing the advocacy of socialism, or a common-law principle imposing civil 
liability for the criticism of government officials would each deter individ-
uals from participating in constitutionally protected activity. But we do 
not need any notion of a chilling effect to tell us that statutes which 
punish the unpunishable are unconstitutionaP8 and the Supreme Court 
does not need the chilling effect doctrine to so hold.39 In these instances 
Writers identified with the former view include R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 197-
200 (1977); T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6-7 (1970); A. Meiklejohn, 
Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government ( 1948); J. S. Mill, On Liberty, ch. 2 (1859); 
Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amend-
ment, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45 (1974). Works focusing on the dangers of state regulation 
include W. Bagehot, "The Metaphysical Basis of Toleration," in II Literary Studies 422-36 
(3d ed. 1884); J. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration ( 1789); J. Milton, Areopagitica 
( 1644); F. Pollock, "The Theory of Persecution," in Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics 
147-75 (1882); Feinberg, "Limits to the Free Expression of Opinion," in J. Feinberg & H. 
Gross, Philosophy of Law 135,136 (1975); Hyneman, Free Speech at What Price?, 56 Am. 
Pol. Sci. Rev. 84 7 (1962); Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, l Phil. & Pub. 
Affairs 204 (1972). Although this latter view, then, is certainly not without support, it seems 
clear that current first amendment doctrine is based primarily upon a view embracing the 
positive values of speech. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark 
Assocs. Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 ( 1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,372 (1927) (Brandeis,]., 
concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
36 Freedom of religion arguably falls within this latter category. Although speech may be 
thought of as a positive virtue or affirmative good, see note 35 supra, religion does not appear 
to occupy a similar position in the constitutional order. Our concern appears to be not with 
the positive values of religion, but rather with the detrimental impact that results when 
government intrudes into the spiritual realm. 
37 Consider, for example, the sixth amendment right to counsel or the broad notions of 
equality embodied in the fourteenth amendment. 
38 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); Kingsley Int'l Pictures 
Corp. v. Regents, 360 U:S. 684, 688-90 (1959). 
39 In a similar vein it should be noted that the overbreadth doctrine pertains exclusively to 
the question of standing. If a party attacking a law or defending a prosecution has engaged 
in constitutionally protected behavior the overbreadth doctrine serves no purpose. l N. · 
Dorsen, P. Bender, & B. Neuborne, Emerson, Haber, and Dorsen's Political and Civil Rights 
in the United States 41 (4th Law School Ed. 1976). 
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of direct prohibition, the chilling effect adds nothing to the analysis; it is 
merely a truism to say that a statute which unconstitutionally penalizes 
protected speech also chills such speech. If the chilling effect is to have 
any significance as an independent doctrine it must refer only to those 
examples of deterrence which result from the indirect governmental 
restriction of protected expression. Therefore, with this essential gloss 
added, we can set forth a tentative definition: A chilling effect occurs when 
individuals seeking to engage in activity protected by the first amendment are 
deterred from so doing by governmental regulation not specifically directed at that 
protected activity. Thus, if a statute which is directed at hard-core pornog-
raphy has the actual effect of deterring an individual from publishing the 
Decameron or Lady Chatterley's Lover, that effect is properly deemed a 
chilling effect.40 Similarly, if a common-law sanction aimed at punishing 
the publication of defamatory factual falsehood causes the suppression of 
truth or opinion, chilling effect reasoning is again applicable.H The same 
analysis is also appropriate where a statute designed to curb incitement to 
riot has the additional effect of inhibiting the advocacy of political 
change.42 The danger of this sort of invidious chilling effect lies in the 
fact that something that "ought" to be expressed is not. Deterred by the 
fear of punishment, some individuals refrain from saying or publishing 
that which they lawfully could, and indeed, should. This is to be feared 
not only because of the harm that flows from the non-exercise of a 
constitutional right, but also because of general societal loss which results 
when the freedoms guaranteed by the first amendment are not exer-
cised.43 That amendment is based on the assumption, perhaps unprov-
able, that the uninhibited exchange of information,44 the active search for 
truth45 and the open criticism of government46 are positive virtues. The 
40 See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518-20 (1948), which, although not using 
chilling effect language, describes the potential overinclusiveness of a vague and overbroad 
statute. 
41 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-79 (1964). 
42 Recent incitement cases have not relied expressly upon the chilling effect doctrine as a 
basis fo~ decision; instead, in vindicating the speakers, these cases have generally held that 
the particular words spoken were protected advocacy rather than unprotected incitement. 
See_Hess v. Indiana, ~14 U.S. 105 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per 
cunam); Watts v. Umted States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). However, it is not unreasonable to 
suggest that the very stringent application of the incitement concept evidenced by these 
decisions is itself designed to create the same margin for error that is embodied in the 
chilling effect doctrine. See notes 180-204 and accompanying text infra. 
43 Perhaps the clearest argument for recognition of the overall social value of individual 
speech was made by Roscoe Pound. 3 R. Pound, Jurisprudence 63-67, 313-17 (1959). For 
further discussion, see generally note 35 supra. 
44 See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 372-77 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. 
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763-65, 769-70 (1976); Bigelow v. 
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975). 
45 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams 
v. Uriited States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
46 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
u.s. 254, 269-71 (1964). 
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chilling effect doctrine is simply the logical corollary to the view that the 
suppression of protected speech is a particularly harmful and undesirable 
situation. 
B. The Chilling Effect Unraveled 
1. Fear, Risk and Uncertainty 
The definition of the chilling effect suggested above assumed that 
individuals will frequently be deterred by governmental regulation not 
intended to cover their contemplated activities. But why would anyone be 
deterred from engaging in conduct A by a statute or ordinance prohibit-
ing only conduct B? The answer must be that these individuals fear 
punishment or other detriment in spite of the lawful nature of their 
contemplated behavior. But again, why should people fear punishment 
under a regulation which does not even apply to them? The rather 
complex answer to this question goes a long way towards explaining the 
major principles underlying the chilling effect doctrine. 
In an ideal world, there would be neither error nor uncertainty in the 
legal process. Regulatory statutes would be applied so as to punish all who 
violated their strictures and none who did not. The fact-finding apparatus 
would in all instances identify with certainty and clarity the true state of 
affairs, and the governing law would be accurately declared and properly 
applied to the facts so found. Moreover, this process would involve no 
social costs; society would not be burdened in any way by punishing the 
guilty or penalizing those civilly liable, and the innocent would suffer no 
detriment in securing acquittal or vindication. As a result of the foregoing 
accuracy and precision, the mechanics of the legal process would be 
wholly predictable and understandable. Any individual could instantly 
and effortlessly ascertain whether his contemplated conduct would be a 
violation of a given enactment; violators would be assured of conviction, 
while the innocent would be guaranteed acquittal. 
One need not be overly skeptical to appreciate the difference between 
this model and reality. To the extent that the model does not reflect the 
actual operation of the legal system, there is injected into the legal process 
both error and the uncertainty which flows from the recognition of this 
imperfection. It is, broadly speaking, this possibility of error and the 
consequent uncertainty which create the chilling effect. There are, how-
ever, various types of error and uncertainty; and one of the major 
deficiencies in explication and application of the chilling effect doctrine 
has been the failure to recognize that there are differences in the causes 
of the chilling effect, differences of kind as ·well as degree, which may 
often justify different legal results. 
The most obvious departure from the utopian legal system just de-
scribed is that the machinery of the law often makes mistakes. The facts 
may be incorrectly determined as a result of being "found" only through 
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interpretation of evidence presented in court.47 The trier-of-fact was not 
actually present when the events in dispute took place, and the gap in 
time and place, which must be filled with the testimony of witnesses 
having human foibles and undisclosed or unknown biases, inevitably leads 
to a possibility of error. In addition, there is always the chance that the 
personal prejudices of the judge or jury and the adversary zeal of the 
litigants and lawyers may overtly or covertly work a distortion of the 
factfinding process. And even in the event that the facts are accurately 
determined, there remains the possibility that the law will be erroneously 
declared or improperly applied to those facts. As a result, there is an 
inherent uncertainty surrounding the outcome of litigation which makes 
it impossible to predict that outcome with a high degree of confidence.48 
Thus, individuals who "know" that their conduct is not proscribed by the 
regulating rule must, if rational, consider the possibility that a court will 
find otherwise. This possibility may be translated into a fear-a fear that 
lawful conduct may nonetheless be punished because of the fallibility 
inherent in the legal process. 
The degree of this fear will vary according to a number of factors, and 
may be likened to the product of the probability of an erroneous verdict 
times the harm produced by such a verdict. In the present context, the 
probability component refers to the likelihood of the erroneous imposi-
tion of legal sanctions on conduct protected by the first amendment; there 
are a variety of elements which may influence just how great this likeli-
hood of error will be. Certainly, as the legal concepts become more 
complex, the probability of error is increased. In the area of free speech, 
the legal principles seem particularly difficult to enunciate, understand 
and apply. The various standards are often far from precise,49 there are 
particularly elusive questions of intent (or knowledge) 50 and effect, 5 1 and 
many determinations by judge and jury involve mixed questions of law 
and fact. 52 In addition, the peculiar problems of vagueness which persis-
47 Frank, supra note 14, at 546-4 7. See note 14 supra. 
4
" Frank, supra note 14, at 548 ("litigation-uncertainty"-"decision-unpredictabllity"). See 
also Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465 (1927). 
49 Consider, for example, the "inevitably obscure" standards defining obscenity. See Paris 
Adult T?e~tr«: I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73-114 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Consider also the 
subtle dJsUncuon between public figures and private individuals in defamation law. See 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 u:s. 29, 45-48 (1971) (opinion of Brennan, J.). 
50 There are difficult questions of scienter in obscenity law, see Smith v. California, 361 
U.S. 147, 154-55 (1959), actual knowledge of falsity in defamation law, see New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278-88 (1964), and communicative intent in symbolic speech 
cases, see, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
51 Consider the expression "fighting words" as it is employed by the Court in Lewis v. City 
of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132-34 (1974), Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525-28 
(1972), and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,571-74 (1942), as well as the entire 
concept of "clear and present danger." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562-63 
(1976); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (per curiam); Schenck v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
52 Vinually all the problems mentioned in notes 49 to 51 supra fall within this category. 
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tently arise in the first amendment area contribute significantly to the 
probability of erroneous legal determinations. 53 Moreover, the complexity 
of the very concept of free speech, coupled with the ·public's natural 
resistance to unpopular or offensive ideas and opinions, provides a clear 
but immeasurable degree of additional built-in error in first amendment 
cases.54 By far, the most difficult questions will arise where the challenged 
expression falls close to the line separating protected and unprotected 
speech.55 Thus, it is this "marginal" conduct that is most likely to be 
erroneously adjudged unlawful,56 and consequently the degree of fear 
will be greatest where such borderline activities are involved. 
One component of the fear product is, thus, the probability of the 
erroneous imposition of legal sanctions. As previously mentioned, the 
other component is the magnitude of the harm resulting from such a 
wrongful finding of guilt or liability. The most obvious measure of this 
harm is the harshness of the penalty. The severity of the potential pun-
ishm(nt magnifies the danger, and hence the fear, of an erroneous judi-
53 Vague regulatory rules make it difficult, if not impossible, for courts to be accurate and 
consistent, and thus increase the probability of error in the adjudication process. In addition, 
judicial findings made under vague statutes need naturally be less precise. The broad 
findings reported from below then make appellate review particularly difficult. Amsterdam, 
Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 80 
( 1960). To the extent that vagueness so increases the possibility of error in the adjudicatory 
process and lessens the opportunity for correcting such error on appeal, there is a heighten-
ing of the inherent uncertainty surrounding litigation and an increase in the likelihood of 
undue deterrence. 
The relatively light treatment given to the vagueness doctrine in this article is due 
primarily to the fact that it has been so successfully analyzed before. For an excellent 
discussion, see Amsterdam, supra. Much of the present article, as it is subsequently devel-
oped, can be viewed as an extension of Amsterdam's "buffer zone" and "clearance space" 
insights to a broader range of first amendment issues. On vagueness generally, see Com-
ment, Recent Supreme Court Developments of the Vagueness Doctrine: Four Cases Involv-
ing the Vagueness Attack on Statutes During the 1972-1973 Term, 7 Conn. L. Rev. 94 
(1974). 
54 
"Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have 
no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you 
naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition." Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Professor Emerson presents a 
persuasive argument that free speech is neither a simple nor a popularly accepted concept; · 
he contends that it is suppression and conformity that come naturally, not tolerance, 
diversity and change. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 
877, 887-91 (1963). To the extent that these characteristics are manifested in those who 
administer or serve in the legal process, the chances of error are increased; and these 
additional errors are likely to be errors of underprotection. This is especially true where the 
speech at issue is critical of the government. There is perhaps an inherent and unavoidable 
conflict of interest involved in entrusting some aspects of the protection of the right to 
criticize those in power to the very people who have the most to lose by such criticism. As 
Ronald Dworkin has pointed out, "decisions about rights against the majority are not issues 
that in fairness ought to be left to the majority." R. Dworkin, supra note 35, at 142. 
55 In some areas, such as obscenity, that which is closest to the line is, of all that is 
protected, least worthy of protection. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 
50, 69-71 ( 1976). But where it is political speech that is at issue, that which is closest to the 
area of non-protection may be that which is both most effective and most important. See 
text accompanying notes 194 & 195 infra. 
56 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). 
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cial determination. In addition to the "objective" harshness of a particular 
penalty-the length of a prison term or the amount of a fi11e-the type of 
punishment itself may also influence the perceived severity of an incorrect 
legal judgment. The possibility of imprisonment coupled with the stigma 
and disabilities which accompany a criminal conviction will most often 
lead an individual to view the criminal penalty as more harmful than a 
civil sanction.57 Therefore, that individual's fear of an erroneous verdict 
will increase where the potential penalty is criminal, even if the probability 
of an incorrect legal determination remains constant. Similarly, if the 
actor is a corporation and there is no possibility of individual criminal 
liability for corporate officials, a large civil judgment will most likely be 
viewed as more serious than a criminal conviction carrying only a minimal 
fine. 58 In this case, the degree of harm for a given probability of error is 
highest when civil liability is erroneously imposed, and hence greater fear 
is generated by the potential civil sanction. Finally, the degree of harm 
will be increased by the actual or perceived extra-judicial effects of the 
erroneous legal judgment. If the sole penalty for being found a subversive 
is loss of employment, there is a certain quantum of possible harm and a 
commensurate degree of fear. If, however, that finding also results in loss 
of personal friendships, injury to reputation, 59 damage to social standing 
and forfeiture of future employment opportunity, then the magnitude of 
the potential harm is significantly increased, with a proportionate increase 
in the degree of fear. 
The fear thus generated by the uncertainty and fallibility of our legal 
system will not have the same effect in all cases. Our concern is with the 
possibility that an individual will be deterred from engaging in a pro-
tected speech-related activity; and while the likelihood of such deterrence 
is shaped by the quantity of fear, it also varies with other factors as well. 
One of these factors is the benefit of the contemplated conduct. If a 
business decision is involved it may be possible to quantify the potential 
benefit by reducing it to a dollar amount-a commercial publisher may be 
able to weigh expected gains against expected losses with some degree of 
precision.60 
57 See Amsterdam, Note, supra note 53, at 69 n.l6. 
•• New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-78 (1964). 
59 See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952): "There can be no dispute about 
the consequences visited upon a person excluded from public employment on disloyalty 
grounds. In the view of the community the stain is a deep one; indeed it has become a badge 
of infamy." The ''penalty" aspects of loss of reputation are suggested by some of the 
procedural due process cases. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); 
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,437 (1971) ("Where a person's name, reputation, 
honor or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an 
opportunity to be heard are essential"). But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Bishop v. 
Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1976). 
60 This will be particularly true when revenues are produced discretely from a particular 
publication. The gains expected to result from the distribution of a book or motion picture, 
for example, can be measured more accurately than the potential profit expected to How 
from the publication of a single article in a newspaper or magazine. 
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On the other hand, it is impossible to quantify the benefit perceived by 
an individual contemplating engaging in speech-related activity when that 
individual is personally committed to the transmission of a particular 
message; nevertheless, it must be recognized that as the perceived benefit 
increases, the likelihood that a given quantum of fear will act as a deter-
rent decreases, all other things being equal. If we acknowledge that fact 
and opinion are often conveyed by individuals with a profit motive rather 
than a personal stake in the dissemination of specific ideas,61 it becomes 
clear that expression may be easily chilled-a simple attack on the pocket-
book will often be sufficient. 
In addition, another factor bearing upon the likelihood of deterrence 
must be mentioned: individual risk-aversion. Assuming a given degree of 
fear, and a given quantum of benefit, certain individuals will in fact be 
deterred while others will not. Thus, the varying degree of risk-aversion 
in individuals will cause differing amounts of deterrence in situations 
where all other factors are the same. 62 
The above discussion assumed that individuals contemplating action 
"know" that their proposed conduct is lawful, but fear that the legal 
system will come to a different, and erroneous, conclusion. More often, 
however, these individuals are troubled not only by the possibility of an 
erroneous legal determination, but also by the uncertainty in their own 
minds as to whether their intended behavior is protected. This uncer-
tainty too can arise from a number of causes; perhaps the most impor-
tant is that it is often difficult to determine whether the contemplated 
conduct is covered by a regulating rule. Herein lies the chief vice of 
vagueness.63 If the terms of a statute or the concepts underlying a 
common-law principle are so amorphous as to create no crystalized view 
of what precise conduct is being regulated, an individual may be quite 
unsure whether his intended behavior is proscribed until after he has 
acted.64 Indeed, some legal concepts and language may be so incapable of 
precise definition and application that any real degree of certainty is 
unattainable. Therefore, when a vague regulatory rule is added to the 
factors previously mentioned, the amount of overall uncertainty is in-
61 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964). 
In Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
771 n.24 ( 1976), the Court suggested that the profit motive may diminish the chiDing effect. 
This analysis is, however, incomplete. It is impossible to determine the extent of the chilling 
effect without considering both benefits and risks. Whether commercial advertising is sus-
ceptible of chilling depends upon the severity of the penalties for false or misleading 
advertising and the frequency of their imposition. 
62 For those who are enamored of formulae, the foregoing may be summarized as follows: 
Deterrence = risk aversion ((probability of punishment X extent of punishment) - expected 
benefit). 
63 See Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465 (1927). See generally L. Tribe, supra note 
9, at 645, 710-24. . 
64 This problem may be particularly acute in the area of obscenity, see notes 147-54 and 
accompanying text infra. 
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creased, with a corresponding increase in fear; the ultimate result is a 
heightened probability of deterrence. 65 
Vagueness refers to the inherent imprecision of the regulatory rule 
which makes both determination and prediction extremely difficult. 66 But 
even a very specific and precise rule may create some degree of uncer-
tainty if it is too "costly" or inconvenient for an individual to make the 
theoretically possible determination demanded by such a rule. 
Consider, for example, a law imposing sanctions on a bookseller for the 
possession of obscene material. 67 The difficulty is not that the merchant is 
theoretically unable to discover the nature of all the publications in his 
store, but rather, that as a practical matter, it is nearly impossible for him 
to do so. The burden imposed by such a statute, particularly on a seller 
with an enormous inventory, is simply too great. Thus, if punishment may 
be inflicted without proof of scienter, a bookseller will be thrust into a 
state of uncertainty. This uncertainty will create a fear, a fear ultimately 
resulting in the chilling of protected activity. 68 
A law requiring a newspaper to be an insurer of the truth of every factual 
statement appearing in each edition gives rise to a similar danger. It is 
conceivable that every fact could be checked to its original source in an 
effort to guarantee accuracy to the limits of human power. But this is 
obviously a practical and economic impossibility, and consequently some 
uncertainty as to the truth of published statements will remain. There-
fore, to impose sanctions for the publication of erroneous factual material 
is to·create some degree of fear and deterrence, a result of the uncertainty 
65 Vagueness really has a twofold effect: it increases the probability of an erroneous 
declaration or application of law, see note 53 supra, and, at the same time, heightens the 
difficulty of the speaker in accurately determining whether his proposed conduct is covered 
by the rule or regulation in question. 
Actually, there is a further danger-the "leakage" that a vague statute permits throughout 
the enforcement process. Excessive vagueness grants too great a discretion to enforcement 
officers and administrative tribunals. Not only is this excess discretion often non-reviewable, 
but it also increases the likelihood that non-judicial sanctions will be imposed on protected 
speech, see Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 732-33 (1961); Kunz v. New York, 340 
U.S. 290 (1951)-whether through frequent harassment by law enforcement officers, fre-
quent threats by administrative bodies, or frequent prosecution brought without expectation 
of success. Each of these actions, even though resulting in eventual vindication, imposes a 
cost or a punishment on an individual contemplating speech, thereby increasing the likeli-
hood of deterrence. See text accompanying notes 46 & 47 supra. The chilling effect results 
from fear which is a product of risk. To the extent that any factor, including vagueness, 
increases the risk, it also increases the chilling effect and thus produces the excess caution 
that comprises a threat to first amendment principles. 
66 Vagueness should not be confused with ambiguity. An ambiguous rule may be precisely 
drafted, but its language may leave doubt as to which of several possible meanings is 
intended. See W. Twining & D. Miers, How To Do Things With Rules 118-24 (1976); J. 
Wilson, Language & The Pursuit of Truth 36-46 (1967). 
67 See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151-54 (1959); notes 160-67 and accom-
panying text infra. 
68 Similarly, the penalization of organizational membership without knowledge as to the 
organization's subversive goals and means may require such detailed checking prior to 
joining that freedom of association will be chilled. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 
246-47 (1957) (opinion of Warren, C.J.); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190 (1952). 
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caused by the impracticability of making a theoretically possible determi-
nation. 59 
In concluding this section it is necessary to describe one final factor 
that significantly contributes to the overall fear and the ultimate likeli-
hood of deterrence: the costs involved in securing a successful judicial 
determination. Our model of the "perfect" legal system assumed that the 
innocent would be acquitted with no cost to the individual. But obviously 
this is not the case. Even if it is hypothesized that the results in court are 
always "correct," a defendant must, nevertheless, shoulder the financial 
burden of litigation,70 expend a considerable amount of time in preparing 
and maintaining a defense and absorb the extrajudicial harm that flows 
from the popular conception that one who is charged, even if acquitted, is 
not entirely free from culpability. 71 Thus, there is a heavy price to pay for 
simply being in a position to have to explain, or defend. These costs of 
securing vindication create a fear of the entire process, with a commens~.­
rate increase in the degree of deterrence; even those with perfect knowl-
edge of the ultimate outcome of litigation will be deterred from engaging 
in protected activity if it will be necessary for them to demonstrate pub-
licly the lawfulness of that conduct. 72 
Before leaving this section, I would like to stress one point which I hope 
was implicit in the foregoing discussion. As long as we are still some 
distance from the model of the "utopian" legal system presented earlier, 
there will always be a chilling effect. It is an unavoidable concomitant of 
the uncertainty and costs of the legal process, and the variability of 
individual risk-aversion. Any regulation will deter someone somewhere 
69 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279 (1964); L. Tribe, supra note 9, at 
639-40 n.7. Where factual assertions can be easily verified, there will be no danger of 
deterrence in requiring a publisher to guarantee the truth of his statements. Commercial 
speech perhaps provides the clearest example. Consider Justice Stewart's concurring com-
ments in Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
777-78 (1976): 
in contrast to the press, which must often attempt to assemble the true facts from 
sketchy and ~ometime~ conflicting sources under the pressure .of publi'cation deadlines, 
the commeroal adveruser generally knows the product or servtce be seeks to sell and is 
in a position to verify the accuracy of his factual representations before he disseminates 
t~en,t. The advertiser's access to the truth about h~s product and its price .substantially 
ehmmates any danger that governmental regulauon of false or mtsleadm~ price or 
product advertising will chill accurate and nondeceptive commerical expressiOn. There 
ts, therefore, little need to sanction "some falsehood in order to protect speech that 
matters." [Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).] 
70 See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 475 n.3 ( 1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). 
71 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 248 (1957). 
72 A similar result may follow from an overly elaborate licensing scheme; a prospective 
publisher or speaker may be deterred by the expense of securing the necessary determina-
tion whether it is permissible to proceed. Thus, although chilling effect reasoning is gener-
ally applicable to subsequent punishment cases, it may also be effectively employed to 
analyze the deterrent impact of the rules and procedures governing a prior restraint scheme. 
See generally Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior 
Restraint, 20 L. & Contemp. Prob. 648, 655-60 ( 1955). Indeed, a full appreciation of the 
chilling effect doctrine substantially undercuts our special abhorrence of prior restraints. See 
notes 203-21 and accompanying text infra. 
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from engaging in conduct that the regulation does not purport to control. 
Obviously, the number of individuals deterred will depend upon the 
magnitude and combination of all the factors here described; but it must 
be recognized that any rule will produce some excess deterrence and thus, 
some chilling effect. Therefore, to say that a regulation is unconstitutional 
because it has a chilling effect on protected activity is to say virtually 
nothing at all. What we must look for is some way of determining under 
what circumstances the inevitable chilling effect becomes great enough to 
require judicial invalidation of legislative enactments, or to justify the 
creation of substantive rules that recognize and account for the invidious 
chill. Although it is no doubt impossible to identify the triggering point 
with mathematical precision, it is hoped that the above discussion has 
introduced and isolated the factors and variables essential to an under-
standing of the problem, if not to its ultimate resolution. 
2. The Principle of Comparative Harm 
It was noted in the introduction to this article that the simple recogni-
tion of the inherent uncertainty surrounding our legal system is only the 
first step toward gaining an understanding of the substantive content of 
the chilling effect doctrine. Once it is admitted that errors will be made, it 
is still necessary to determine which of the various possible errors is the 
more harmful. In the present context it was posited that a wrongful 
limitation of speech is a priori more serious than the erroneous overexten-
sion of free speech.73 With the inevitability of error thus admitted, and 
the preference for one type of error thus expressed, the final step is the 
formulation of legal rules which account for the inevitable by favoring the 
preferred. No discussion of this component of the chilling effect doctrine 
can start anywhere but with Speiser v. Randall. 74 This case, too often 
ignored by the casebooks and literature, accounts for a major segment of 
first amendment theory and should stand among the most important 
constitutional cases of modern times. · 
The facts of Speiser are relatively simple. California granted a property 
tax exemption to veterans of World War II, with a requirement that 
applicants for. the exemption sign an oath stating: "I do not advocate the 
overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of 
California by force or violence or other unlawful means, nor advocate the 
support of a foreign Government against the United States in event of 
hostilities." 75 This oath was part of a larger procedural scheme whereby 
the applicant was charged with the burden of demonstratng eligibility for 
the exemption by proving that he was not a person who advocated such 
violent overthrow. 76 Assuming that the exemption might be denied per-
73 See notes 15-19 and accompanying text supra; notes 88 & 119 infra. 
74 357 u.s. 513 (1958). 
75 /d. at 515. 
76 Id. at 521-22. 
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sons engaging in the proscribed speech,7 7 Mr. Justice Brennan,78 speaking 
for the Court, nonetheless found the allocation of the burden of proof 
constitutionally impermissible. He noted: 
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in 
factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one 
party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as a criminal 
defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by 
the process of placing on the other party the burden of producing a 
sufficiency of proof in the first instance, and of persuading the 
factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. ... Where the transcendent value of speech is involved, 
due process certainly requires in the circumstances of this case that 
the State bear the burden of persuasion to show that the appellants 
engaged in criminal speech. 79 
Justice Brennan's reference to the criminal process highlights the sig-
nificance of Speiser. In a criminal trial there is, as in all litigation, the 
possibility of an erroneous result80-a guilty defendant may be mistakenly 
acquitted or an innocent defendant wrongfully convicted. If everything in 
the criminal process were evenly balanced, if neither the prosecution nor 
defense were given any kind of advantage, there is no reason to believe 
that one type of error would occur more frequently than another; we 
would have as many innocent people locked behind bars as we had 
criminals running loose in the streets.81 But society's values are not so 
evenly balanced. The wrongful conviction of the innocent is seen as a 
more serious error than the wrongful acquittal of the guilty.82 The Black-
stonian maxim that "it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that 
one innocent suffer,"83 is but an expression of the differing degrees of 
social tolerance for the two possihle errors. 84 This societal preference for 
77 /d. at 519-20. This assumption may have been proper at the time, see Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494, 501-11 (1951), but would clearly be unjustified today, see Brandenburg 
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1961) (per curiam). Speiser, significant as it is, may well have 
been decided as it was in an effort to avoid adjudicating the substantive validity of the oath. 
78 I find it noteworthy that not only Speiser, but virtually all of the other opinions employ-
ing chilling effect analysis were authored by Mr. Justice Brennan. His recognition in Speiser 
of uncertainty and the comparative harm of various errors seems to have profoundly 
affected his thinking about first amendment issues. The chilling effect doctrine in the 
Supreme Court, both substantively and procedurally, is clearly the work of Mr. Justice 
Brennan. It is significant that virtually every opinion in a first amendment £ase written by 
Mr. Justice Brennan since 1958 has contained a reference or citation to Speiser. 
79 357 U.S. at 525-26. 
80 See notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra. 
81 To say that there would be an equal number is an admitted oversimplification, since it 
ignores the fact that those who are in fact guilty are more likely to be charged and 
prosecuted. But the extent to which guilty persons are charged is itself dependent upon the 
arresting officer's perception of the difficulty of obtaining a conviction. 
82 See Kaplan, supra note 16, at 1076-77. See also Birmingham, Remarks on 'Probability' in 
Law: Mostly, a Casenote and a Book Review, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 535 (1978). 
83 IV W. Blackstone, Commentaries *358. 
84 Others would have aimed for a different ratio. See J. Fortescue, Commendation of the 
Laws of England 45 (F. Grigor trans. 1917) (20 to 1); 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown *289 (5 
to 1); W. Paley, Moral and Political Philosophy, in Works 27, 142 (1831) (20 to 1); I T. 
Starkie, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Evidence 506 (4th Am. ed. 1832) (99 to 1). See 
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a particular type of error is reflected at the rule-making level-in a 
criminal trial the prosecution must shoulder the burden of proof, guilt 
must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused is guaranteed 
a privilege against self-incrimination and so on. All this serves to weight 
the process heavily in favor of the defendant. Ideally, we convict only 
those who are clearly guilty on the evidence; at the same time, those who 
are only probably guilty are likely to be acquitted. The net result is that 
many who are in fact guilty are acquitted, but few who are truly innocent 
are convicted. It is like trawling with a coarse net-you catch all the big 
fish, but many of the small ones slip away. 
But let us return from criminology and ichthyology and continue our 
discussion of the first amendment. By placing the burden of proof upon 
the state in Speiser, the Court, in effect, forced California to grant the tax 
exemption to a number of persons who do in all probability advocate 
violent or unlawful subversion. These are the "guilty" who escape not 
because they are blameless, but because the state is unable to muster 
sufficient proof to carry its burden. On the other hand, the effect of the 
California procedure, under which the applicant shouldered the burden, 
is to disqualify from the exemption some individuals who do not advocate 
subversion, but who cannot or will not meet the requirement of proving 
otherwise. These are the "innocent," wrongfully punished. Thus, errors 
will be made under either procedure. However, the California mechanism 
minimizes the erroneous granting of the exemption in exchange for a 
consequential increase in the number of non-subversive veterans who are 
denied their deserved benefits.· What makes this allocation of the burden 
of proof impermissible is the fact that the first amendment makes the 
wrongful denial the more serious error by definition-an erroneous pun-
ishment of free speech and belief is by constitutional stipulation more 
harmful than the erroneous granting of a tax exemption to a subversive. 
There is greater "social disutility"85 in suppressing protected speech than 
in awarding a state tax exemption to a "fifth columnist," just as there is 
greater "social disutility" in wrongfully punishing the innocent than in 
generally G. Williams, The Proof of Guilt 186-90 (3d ed. 1963); Ashford & Risinger, Pre-
sumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 
Yale L.J. 165, 182-86 (1969); Birmingham, A Model of Criminal Process: Game Theory and 
Law, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 58, 65 ( 1970); Dershowitz, Preventive Detention: Social Threat, 6 
Trial, No. I, at 22-26 (1969-70); supra note 16. Compare the above sources with 
Tribe, supra note 16, at 385-90. Implicit in the numerical variations above is a differing view 
of the relative utility of convicting the guilty as compared to the disutility of convicting the 
innocent. In other words, the various ratios reflect the writers' evaluation of the comparative 
harm of the two possible errors. 
The most specific application of this "matheraatical" jurisprudence in the case law is Mr. 
Justice Harlan's concurrence in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361!-75 (1970). This concur-
rence and Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court placed heavy reliance on Speiser. 
However, the impact of Winship has diminished significantly, and with it the importance of 
the "mathematical" aspect of the case as a critical factor in criminal due process analysis. See 
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 Harv. L. 
Rev. I, 98 (1977). 
85 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See note 119 infra. 
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mistakenly acquitting the guilty.86 The "transcendent value"87 of speech 
receives the same priority that Blackstone gave to individual liberty.88 
The principle of comparative harm is, thus, simply a product of the 
recognition of the inevitability of error in the litigation process; the 
principle forces us to confront the imperfection of our legal system by 
demanding that we identify those errors which we view as most harmful. 
In the context of free speech adjudication, the recognized preeminence of 
the first amendment causes us to acknowledge that the "greater" harm 
flows from an erroneous denial of first amendment protection. This 
acknowledgement leads to a substantive result like that in Speiser. Recogni-
tion that such a result is an essential by-product of the principle of 
comparative harm affords a fuller understanding of the conceptual un-
derpinnings of the chilling effect doctrine. To the extent that the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof, or the existence of any legal rule, tends to 
increase the risk of an erroneous judgment against speech, there is a 
proportionate increase in the fear of such a judgment-the degree of 
fear, and hence, the likelihood of deterrence follow the actual degree of 
risk. Recognizing this, Justice Brennan commented in Speiser: 
The vice of the present procedure is that, where particular speech 
falls close to the line separating the lawful and the unlawful, the 
possibility of mistaken factfinding-inherent in all litigation-will 
create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be penalized. The 
man who knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade an-
other of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far wider 
of the unlawful zone than if the State must bear these burdens. This 
is especially to be feared when the complexity of the proofs and the 
generality of the standards applied ... provide but shifting sands on 
which the litigant must maintain his position.89 
By choosing rules that minimize the risk of an erroneous judgment, we 
lessen the fear generated by that risk, and thereby reduce the extent to 
which people are deterred from engaging in protected speech-related 
activity. This is the essence of the chilling effect doctrine. 
But it must be remembered that, as there are two types of error, there 
are two possible chilling effects. By placing the burden of proof on the 
86 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
87 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. at 526. 
88 In one sense, Speiser is an easy case. The harm flo:oving from a wrongful denial of the 
exemption is a harm to an individual interest established by the Bill of Rights as one of 
overriding importance-it is an injury to an interest that must be protected even at the 
expense of the public. An erroneous grant of the exemption, on the other hand, injures the 
general public interest, with no damage to individual rights. In cases such as this, the 
question of comparative harm is rather readily resolved. An analogous situation arises in the 
criminal process model, where the imprisonment of the innocent is a deprivation of an 
individual right, while the release of the guilty harms the general public. What makes the 
free press-fair trial controversy so complex is the fact that an individual constitutional 
interest sits on both sides of the balance; it is not so readily apparent which error is 
comparatively the more harmful. On this issue, see my exchange with Professor Dworkin in 
The New York Review of Books, Dec. 7, 1978, at 39-41. 
89 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. at 525-26. 
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state in Speiser, the Court increased the risk that California would errone-
ously grant tax exemptions to undeserving subversives. It is conceivable 
that a fear of such erroneous determinations might deter governmental 
bodies confronted with the Speiser rule from granting such tax exemptions 
at all, thus causing, in a sense, a chilling of that activity. Yet no one speaks 
of the chilling effect in this situation; chilling effect reasoning is meaning-
ful only in the context of a preferred value. The chilling effect doctrine 
.reflects the view that the harm caused by the chilling of free speech (or 
other protected activity) is comparatively greater than the harm resulting 
from the chilling of the other activities involved. And, the logical and 
necessary mandate of the chilling effect doctrine is that legal rules be 
formulated so as to allocate the risk of error away from the preferred 
value, thereby minimizing the occurrence of those errors which we deem 
the most harmful. The Supreme Court recognized its obligation to follow 
this mandate in Speiser v. Randall. A close look at the areas of defamation, 
obscenity and incitement reveals that a similar, though often unexpressed, 
recognition was present there as well. 
III. THE CHILLING EFFECT DocTRINE APPLIED 
A. Defamation 
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 90 the Supreme Court resolved the con-
flict between the profound national interest in the uninhibited debate 
of public issues and the interest of the individual in being free from de-
famatory assault by carving out a constitutional privilege that protects 
good faith critics of government officials. 91 Recognizing that a rule 
requiring the critic to guarantee the truth of all his statements might 
dampen the vigor and limit the variety of public debate,92 the Court held: 
"The constitutional guarantees require ... a federal rule that prohibits a 
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relat-
ing to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made 
with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."93 In addition, the Court 
held that the constitutional .standard requires that the plaintiff demon-
strate such actual malice with "convincing clarity."94 By analyzing the New 
York Times decision in light of the discussion presented in the first portion 
of this article, one realizes the critical role played by the chilling effect 
doctrine in the resolution of the case. The doctrine, recognizing inevitable 
uncertainty and embracing the principle of comparative harm, was in-
strumental in determining where the line of privilege defining the cate-
90 376 U.S. 254 ( 1964). 
91 See gmerally L. Tribe, supra note 9, at 631-38; Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note 
on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191. 
92 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279. 
93 /d. at 279-80. 
94 /d. at 285-86. 
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gory of punishable defamation was drawn and in guiding the Court in the 
formulation of the subsidiary rule governing the burden of proof as well. 
The use of a chart may be helpful in demonstrating the substantive role 
played by the chilling effect doctrine in the formulation of the Times rule. 
At one end of this chart we designate an area representing opinion95 and 
correct factual information. At the opposite end of the spectrum we 
mark an area for the intentionally false statement, an utterance clearly 
"no essential part of any exposition of ideas."96 
Thus, we begin with: 




The Supreme Court has noted that "there is no constitutional value in 
false statements of fact," 97 whether such falsehoods are intentionally 
stated or simply carelessly made. 98 A new line, therefore must be added, 
separating not only the intentional, but, in fact, all falsehood from the 
area encompassing speech that does contain some measure of social value. 
Our chart now takes on this form: 
correct factual information 
opinion 




In the ideal world, with our utopian model of the legal process fully 
operative, the legal line dividing the punishable and the unpunishable 
should match exactly the boundary drawn on our chart. A glance at the 
New .York Times rule, however, reveals that this is not the case. The Times 
decision extends constitutional protection to an entire class of defamatory 
falsehood-that uttered without actual malice. Thus, the final version of 
our chart, with the New York Times line of privilege added, looks like 
this: 99 
95 
"Because 'there is no such thing as a false idea,' Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 l}.S. 
323, 339 ( 1974), statements of opinion, even if expressed in pejorative terms, are protected 
by the first amendment." L. Tribe, supra note 9, at 635 n.22. 
96 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
97 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
98 /d. See also Justice White's concurrence in Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 
295 (1971). He noted: "Misinformation has no merit in itself; standing alone it is as 
antithetical to the purposes of the First Amendment as the calculated lie .... Its substance 
contributes nothing to intelligent decisionmaking by citizens or officials; it achieves nothing 
but gratuitous injury." /d. at 301 (citation omitted). 
99 If the plaintiff is a private individual, the structure of the chart would remain the same, 
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correct factual information 
opinion 
false factual intentionally false 
statement statement 
(A) social value (B) New York Times (C) 
threshold rule 
It is immediately apparent that Area B speech receives constitutional 
protection, even though the Court has candidly admitted that such speech 
has no independent constitutional value. An explanation for this "over-
protection" can be found in the principles underlying the chilling effect 
doctrine. The imperfection of our legal system forces us to protect Area B 
material not because it is intrinsically worth protecting, but in order to 
ensure that Area A material is not mistakenly penalized. The mandate of 
Speiser requires us to create a "margin for error" or a buffer zone to 
guarantee that individuals who do "steer far [wide] of the unlawful 
zone" 100 are in fact rarely deterred from engaging in Area A activity. 
Professor Tribe has isolated some of the factors which explain the Court's 
readiness to afford a measure of "strategic" protection to non-malicious 
defamatory falsehoods. He notes: 
[A) great danger of self-censorship arises from the fear of guessing 
wrong-the fear that the trier of fact, proceeding by formal processes 
of proof and refutation, will after the event reject the individual's 
judgment of truth. This fear is exacerbated by the danger that a jury 
will not fairly find the facts in cases involving unpopular speakers or 
unorthodox ideas. And there is simply the cost of litigating a defama-
tion suit, even where the publisher is relatively confident that a court 
somewhere will ultimately vindicate his judgment.10 i 
But beyond these reasons, there is an additional factor that goes a long 
way toward explaining the rationale of the New York Times rule. In the 
Times decision, Justice Brennan stressed that the failure of the New York 
Times to check through all its files in order to verify the truth of the 
statements contained in the allegedly defamatory advertisement could not 
be used to support a finding of malice. 102 The Court was unwilling to 
endorse a requirement that forced a publisher to absorb the costs of 
making that theoretically possible determination. 103 The essence of the 
Times rule, then, is that no newspaper can realistically be expected to bear 
the burden of verifying all the factual statements appearing in each of its 
editions. The impracticability of forcing a publisher to become a guaran-
with the substitution of "negligently false facts" in area C. See generally Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
100 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958). For an early reference to margin of 
error, see Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 371-72 (1946) (Rutledge, .f., concurring). 
101 L. Tribe, supra note 9, at 634. 
102 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 287. The Court thought it sufficient that 
the Times had relied upon the reputation of those individuals who had submitted the 
advertisement. /d. 
103 See notes 65-69 and accompanying text supra. 
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tor of truth adds considerably to the uncertainty already inherent in the 
legal system. This additional uncertainty causes a proportionate increase 
in a publisher's fear of the litigation process, a fear translated into in-
creased deterrence, in this context a heightened degree of self-censorship. 
The New York Times requirement of actual malice eliminates the additional 
uncertainty occasioned by the sheer magnitude of the task of having to 
check all the facts involved. 104 In so doing, the Times rule reduces the 
degree of self-censorship or chilling, but at a price. As noted, factual 
errors are deemed to have no independent constitutional value; 105 thus 
every factual falsehood permissibly published, every "Area B" statement 
"allowed" by the New York Times standard, represents an "escape" of the 
"guilty." 106 Recognizing our imperfect system of imperfect knowledge, 
recalling the principle of comparative harm, and acknowledging our obli-
gation to follow the mandate of Speiser v. Randall, we find that the method 
of prevention of overcautious self-censorship must be the tolerance of 
undercautious regulation. 107 To avoid the chilling effect, we must prohibit 
the imposition of sanctions in instances where ideally they would be 
permitted. 
This result of "strategic protection" 108 is enhanced by the additional 
requirement imposed by the New York Times case-that actual malice be 
proved with convincing clarity. 109 This requirement, like the assignment 
of the burden of proof in Speiser and the existence of protective proce-
dures in a criminal trial, is but a skewed allocation of the chance of 
error.ll 0 The ultimate result of the convincing clarity requirement is that 
some plaintiffs who ought to be compensated, even under the New York 
Times rule, will not recover; their injury goes unredressed not because 
they are undeserving, but because they are unable to prove the actual 
104 It is possible that this "magnitude- of the ~ffort" chilling could provide a principled 
distinction in some instances between the legal standards governing press defamation and 
those governing private defamation. The press must consider the costs of establishing and 
maintaining a formalized procedure for verifying numerous facts on a daily basis, a problem 
that does not confront those not in the communications business. This question remains 
open after Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See generally Hill, Defamation 
and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1205, 1223-27, 1285-91 (1976); 
Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodology, 25 U.C.L.A. 
L. R~v. 915 (1978); N<_>te, First Amendment Protection Against Libel Actions: Distinguishing 
Media and Non-Media Defendants, 47 So. Cal. L. Rev. 902 (1974); Note, Problems in 
Defining the Institutional Status of the Press, II U. Rich. L. Rev. 177 (1976). 
105 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. 
Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 301 (1971) (White, J., concurring). See note 98 supra. 
106 See note 114 infra. 
107 See Kalven, supra note 91, at 213. 
10s Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). 
109 376 U.S. at 285-86. See generally Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971) 
(holding use of "preponderance of the evidence" standard constitutional error). For a 
general discussion, see Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 Va. L: Rev. 1349, 1370-75, 1381-86 (1975). 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), is still of interest on the burden of 
proof issue, particularly because of Justice Brennan's reliance on the rationale of In re 
Winship. ld. at 50. 
"" See text accompanying notes 80-84 supra. 
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malice that in fact exists. 111 Forcing the plaintiff to shoulder a heavy 
burden of proof decreases the risk of erroneous determinations against 
speech. The publisher's fear of such determinations is thus diminished, 
with an accompanying decrease in the amount of self-censorship.U 2 In 
this manner, the overall chilling of protected speech is reduced. 
But there is, of course, a price to be paid. The "convincing clarity"113 
standard, and indeed the entire rule of the New York Times case, ensures 
that publishers are rarely penalized erroneously, but not without the cost 
of wrongfully depriving deserving plaintiffs of their expected reme-
dies.114 The New York Times decision is, at bottom, a finding that an 
erroneous penalization of a publisher is more harmful than a mistaken 
denial of a remedy for an injury to reputation. 115 Indeed, some individ-
uals, perceiving the difficulties created by the New York Times rule116 and 
realizing the increased possibility of erroneous judgments against deserv-
ing plaintiffs, may. be deterred from risking their "good names" at all; to 
the extent that this occurs, there is arguably a chilling effect on the entry 
of individuals into public life. 117 But there is no "transcendent" value in 
the existence of public figures and no "preferred" position in our con-
111 See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968). 
112 Obviously, the very existence of any libel laws will produce some self-censorship. The 
question is how much of this chilling effect should be tolerated. See generally Anderson, Libel 
and Press Self-Censorship, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 422 (1975). It is perhaps instructive to point out 
that we could ensure against the punishment of the innocent by punishing none of the 
guilty. 
113 See note I 09 supra. 
, .. Perhaps the classic example of the "costs" of the New York Times rule is presented in 
Ocala Star-Banner v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971). There is little doubt that the plaintiff 
Leonard Damron was wrongfully injured by the publication in question. Damron, then 
mayor of Crystal River, Fl()rida, lost his bid for reelection two weeks after the appearance of 
the erroneous publication. The issue thus became the societal costs, in first amendment 
terms, of grJ.nting him a remedy. 
115 The low comparative weight given to reputation has not been ignored by the Court. 
See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) ("The risk of this exposure is an essential 
incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of 
press"). See also Rosenbloom v. Metro media, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 4 7-48 ( 1971). 
116 These potential plaintiffs include not only public officials, but also public figures. 
Curtis Publishing•Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). For the parameters of the public official 
concept, see Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 
(1966). For the definition of public figure, see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 
(1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-45 (1974). 
117 In England, where the law of defamation is especially strict, commentators have 
rejected the principles of New York Times on this very basis, arguing that the chilling of entry 
into public life is either more likely or more serious than the chilling of the press. R. 
McEwen & P. Lewis, Gatley on Libel and Slander 223 n.56 (7th ed. 1974) (acceptance of New 
York Times rule "would tend to deter sensitive and honourable men from seeking public 
positions of trust and responsibility, and leave them open to others who have no respect for 
their reputation"); T. Weir, A Casebook on Tort 425 (3d ed. 1974) (acknowledging that 
differences between American and English law are based on differences in how the two 
countries view the comparative value of free speech and good reputation). See also Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 400 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) ("It is not at all 
inconceivable that virtually unrestrained defamatory remarks about private citizens will 
discourage them from speaking out and concerning themselves with social problems"). 
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stitutional order for reputation.U8 Thus, it is the deterrence of newspaper 
publishers and the consequent chilling of first amendment activity which 
ex hypothesi is more harmful. 119 Taken to the extent of its logic, this would 
mean that a constitutionally favored interest, such as free speech, 
would inevitably occupy a position of absolute priority over a value not so 
favored, such as reputation. But clearly, this is not the case; if it were 
there would simply be no defamation laws at all. The New York Times 
decision represents a balancing of competing interests, a balancing per-
formed at the rule-making level. And acknowledgement of the inevitabil-
ity of error and the priority of one type of error mandates that any such 
balancing process be heavily weighted in favor of the constitutional inter-
est. 
Recognition of the New York Times balance and its reflection in the 
Court's creation of a buffer zone of strategic protection affords a starting 
base for an analysis of two lines of cases suggesting procedural modifica-
tions of defamation law. First, there are those decisions urging that 
summary judgment be liberally granted in defamation cases; 120 second, 
there are various opinions indicating that something more than minimum 
contacts may be necessary in order to subject an out-of-state publisher to 
long-arm jurisdiction. 121 These decisions are premised upon the belief 
that the expense of litigation, and indeed its very pendency, perhaps in a 
distant forum from which little revenue is earned, will operate to chill the 
118 See note 115 supra. But see note 117 supra. 
119 Perhaps one of the disadvantages of the first amendment is that it compels us virtually 
always to say that the wrongful suppression of speech is the more harmful error. As with all 
rules, it achieves consistency and predictability at the expense of flexibility and justice in the 
particular case. For a comment on the first amendment by a prominent English jurist, see 
the opinion of Lord Scarman in Senior v. Holdsworth ex parte Independent Television News 
Ltd., [1975] 2 W.L.R. 987, at 1000 (C.A.). 
120 See, e.g., Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858, 864-65 (5th Cir. 1970); 
Thompson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 394 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 
884 (1968); Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 
U.S. 1011 (1967); Meeropool v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd 505 F.2d 
232 (2d Cir. 1974) and 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). See 
generally L. Tribe, supra note 9, at 642-43. For additional sympathetic commentary, see 
Anderson, supra note 112, at 435-38; Rendleman, Chapters of the Civil Jury, 65 Ky. L.J. 
769, 778-87 (1977). 
121 See, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology v. Verlag, 536 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976); 
New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966); Buckley v. New York Times 
Co., 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964); Walker v. Savell, 335 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1964). The 
principle has been weakened slightly in some recent cases. See, e.g., Edwards v. Associated 
Press, 512 F.2d 258,266-68 (5th Cir. 1975); Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 515 F.2d 1208 
(5th Cir. 1975); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967); Sipple v. Des 
Moines Register & Tribune Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 143, 147 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1978). Some courts 
have rejected the concept completely. See, e.g., Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d 316 
(lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 911 (1977); David v. National Lampoon, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 
1097 (D.S.C. 1977). See also Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir.1967) 
(opinion of Friendly, J.). See generally Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the 
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 227 ( 1967); Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction 
Over Publishers: To Chill a Mocking Word, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 342 (1967); Comment, 
Constitutional Limitations to Long Arm Jurisdiction in Newspaper libel Cases, 34 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 436 (1967). 
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distribution of nationally circulated publications.122 The cases are clearly 
correct in their prediction of a chilling effect; however, these decisions 
seem to have underestimated the extent to which New York Times and its 
progeny have already accounted for that effect. 
The chart previously introduced in this discussion of defamation and 
the text accompanying it indicated that the New York Times standard 
protects for strategic reasons that which ideally ought not be protected. 123 
Factual falsity falling within Area B is protected not for its independent 
value, but to guard against the mistaken penalization of Area A material. 
The New York Times rule, standing on the foundations of the chilling 
effect doctrine, has created a buffer zone, a margin for error. If this zone 
is sufficiently wide, 124 then additional procedural support, often provided 
at the expense of Erie principles, 125 is unnecessary. 
Consider, particularly, the summary judgment cases. 126 If the merits of 
the controversy involve such close issues that summary judgment might 
not be granted under traditional principles, then the disputed material 
must fall no further to the left than Area B on our chart. The imposition 
of a moderate penalty-the cost of litigation-is not inconsistent with New 
122 The Fifth Circuit has applied this reasoning more to regional publishers sued outside 
of their region than to national publishers. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 
586 (5th Cir. 1967). 
123 The same sort of strategic protection is afforded, albeit to a lesser extent, by the 
standard developed to deal with the problem of defamation of private individuals in Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (holding state libel laws imposing liability without 
fault to be violative of first amendment). 
124 It could be argued that the distortion of reality caused by the imperfect nature of the 
legal system makes it impossible to know whether the buffer zone is wide enough. But, as 
with all legal rules, there is no reason to believe that an a posteriori evaluation of the results 
under a rule cannot provide a basis for evaluating the success of a rule. Adjustments are 
inevitable, and it is a fallacy to reject a concept merely because it is imprecise. Edmund 
Burke once said, "Though no man can draw a stroke between the confines of night and day, 
still light and darkness are on the whole tolerably distinguishable." A. Flew, Thinking About 
Thinking 104 (1975) (quoting Burke). Once we recognize that we are balancing the .frequency 
of errors of two kinds, two conclusions follow. First, it is an invalid argument to say that 
there is "too much" free speech because of a particular instance in which the freedom has 
been granted in an undeserving case. Such abuses are inherent in granting meaningful 
protection to free expression. They are built in to the system. Only the identification of an 
unacceptable frequency of such errors is truly relevant. This leads to the second conclusion, 
that there is nothing inherently wrong with tests and standards that are changed or adjusted. 
The relatively continuous modifications in the tests of obscenity, constitutionally protected 
defamation and "clear and present danger," for example, may be only part of the continu-
ous "fine tuning" process that is required in order to arrive at an acceptable balance between 
the severity and frequency of two types of errors. 
125 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The underlying premise of the 
defamation cases, most clearly explained in Gertz, is that the constitutional standards repre-
sent a balance between first amendment interests in the protection of the press and the 
state's right to protect reputation. To the extent that federal courts in diversity cases make 
"procedural" rulings of this sort, they are adding to the weight on the constitutional side and 
thus subtracting from the state's substantive authority which is purportedly protected by tlie 
balance struck. 
126 See note 120 supra. See also Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 564, 566 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969) (interlocutory appeals should be more freely allowed in libel 
cases). 
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York Times; at worst Area B material, which is strategically but not ideally 
protected speech, will be chilled. Traditional summary judgment princi-
ples are sufficient to ensure the protection of Area A materials. 127 
There is a serious fallacy in assuming that procedural modifications 
accounting for free speech interests are necessarily positive adjustments 
required by the priority of first amendment values. The fallacy lies in 
ignoring the fact that any rule itself embodies a balancing of interests, a 
balancing that ideally has already accounted for the existing procedural 
structure. The adjustment of a procedural mechanism to compensate for 
first amendment interests is double-counting-the initial substantive rule 
has, ideally; already made that accommodation. The Supreme Court could 
have chosen to protect freedom of speech to a greater extent than it 
already has. It could have eliminated defamation actions entirely, re-
quired the application of the "actual malice" standard to all defamation 
actions, 128 or demanded that plaintiffs prove every element of their case 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 129 But the adoption of such rules would, 
under present thinking, have given insufficient weight to the countervail-
ing interests in reputation. The principles established in New York Times, 
adjusted in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 130 and embellished in Time, Inc. v. 
Firestone 131 represent what the current Court deems the proper accom-
modation. When a procedural rule is modified or a jurisdictional 
standard altered in an attempt to pay deference to first amendment 
interests, the ultimate result is no less than a reworking of the Supreme 
Court's balance. It would seem that such innovation must be left to the 
Supreme Court, which forged the original balance. 
If the reader will excuse a brief digression, I would like to demonstrate 
that the procedural modifications endorsed by the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit in Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local 
Joint Executive Board of Culinary Workers 132 provide an example of alower 
127 The same analysis would appear to answer those cases urging a more stringent 
jurisdictional threshold than the traditional "minimum contacts" standard. See note 121 
supra. However, there may be an important distinction. Newspapers and magazines contain a 
wide variety of articles and advertisements, published in an inseparable mass. A publisher 
faced with the expense of having to defend libel charges stemming from the circulation of 
Area B material in a distant forum providing him with little revenue, may decide to forego 
publication there entirely. Thus, the chilling of Area B material for a particular locality 
caused by the minimal jurisdictional standard may effectively result in the chilling of Area A 
material as well. For this reason, a more demanding jurisdictional threshold is, arguably, 
justified. 
128 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion), subse-
quently rejected in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
129 See notes 109-13 and accompanying text supra. 
130 418 u.s. 323 (1974). 
131 424 U.S. 448 (1976). See generally Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitu-
tional Policy-Making, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 645 ( 1977). 
132 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977). See generally Note, 
Protecting First Amendment Rights of Defendants by Limiting Plaintiffs' Access to the 
Courts: Procedural Approaches to Noerr and Sullivan, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 681 (1978); Note, 
Franchise Realty v. Culinary Workers: "Chilling" the Sham Exception, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 407 
(1978). 
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court's tampering with a previously established accommodation of inter-
ests; this court felt obliged to act because of the recognized "sensitivity of 
First Amendment guarantees to the threat of harassing !itigation."133 
Franchise Realty involved the applicability of the so-called Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine 134 which affords a first amendment based immunity from the 
Sherman Antitrust Act for concerted efforts aimed at influencing public 
officials, even if such joint efforts are intended ultimately to eliminate 
competition. 135 In Franchise Realty, the plaintiffs contended that the defen-
dants' concerted lobbying efforts fell within the "sham" exception to 
Noerr-Pennington-the immunity is forfeited where the joint action, "os-
tensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham 
to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere 
directly with the business relationships of a competitor .... "136 The Ninth 
Circuit held that a plaintiff alleging such a "sham" is required to frame his 
complaint with greater specificity than that usually required under the 
liberal notice pleading envisioned by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In dis~issing the complaint, the court explained that "where a plaintiff 
seeks damages or injunctive relief, or both, for conduct which is prima 
facie protected by the First Amendment, the danger that the mere pen-
dency· of the action will chill the exercise of First Amendment rights 
requires more specific allegations than would otherwise be required." 137 
The court was, of course, correct in concluding that such a chilling 
effect would result. Some individuals might refrain from engaging in 
concerted lobbying efforts for fear that their lawful conduct might be 
held unlawful, or out of a desire to avoid the expense, trouble and 
uncertainty of having to demonstrate that legality in court. But the Su-
preme Court, recognizing the potential deterrent effect of the "sham" 
exception, could have granted an absolute Noerr-Pennington immunity 
embracing no exceptions at all; the Court might have opted to afford a 
measure of strategic protection to some "shams" in order to ensure that no 
133 542 F.2d at 1082. 
134 Eastern R.R. Pres. Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); UMW v. 
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 ( 1965). See generally Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to 
Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 80 (1978). 
135 UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965). Although Noerr and Pennington could 
have been based upon free speech principles, the decisions were in fact grounded in the first 
amendment right "to petition the Government for a redress of grievances," an area of 
generally unexplored constitutional doctrine. 
136 Eastern R.R. Pres. Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight,.365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961). The 
"sham" exception was first suggested by Justice Black writing in Noerr. /d. at 144. More 
recent elaboration of the doctrine has come primarily from two cases: California Motor 
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) and Otter Tail Power Co. v. United 
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). See generally Fischel, supra note 134, at 106-10; Handler, 
Tw~nty-Five Yea:s of Antitrust, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 415, 430-39 (1973); Note, Limiting the 
Anutrust Immumty for Concerted Attempts to Influence Courts and Adjudicatory Agencies: 
Analogies to Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 715 (1973). 
137 Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary 
Workers, 542 F.2d at 1082-83. 
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legitimate first amendment petitioning would be chilled. By not creating a 
buffer zone or a margin for error, the Court presumably was willing to 
accept some chilling of protected activity. In accommodating the compet-
ing concerns the Court {~lay have recognized the strong governmental 
interest reflected in the antitrust laws or may have accorded a low weight 
to the .first amendmcr.nt interest in protecting speech activities of a com-
merci~,i" nature. 138 In setting up procedural barriers to pleading and 
proving a "sham," t~e Ninth Circuit's Franchise Realty opinion has, in fact, 
recast'the Supr~me'. Court's balancing of the interests involved. No doubt 
the circuit court' was correct in its analysis and assessment of ,the potential 
for chi.lling created by the "sham" exception and. rhe libere-1 pleading 
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; but, t~e ultimate 
result. of the .. Franchise Realty case is, at bottom, no less than a partial 




A look at the Supreme Court's work in the realm of obscenity reveals, 
the significant role that the chilling effect doctrine has played in guiding· 
the Court in its enunciation of legal rules and standards controlling in 
this area. An analysis similar to that previously proposed for defamation 
demonstrates that the chilling effect doctrine was a key factor aiding the 
Court in its determination of where to draw the line separating punish-
able obscenity from protected speech; in addition, chilling effect reason-
ing was utilized by the Court. in its formulation of subsidiary rules imple-
menting obscenity adjudication. 
With the reader's indulgence, I would again like to employ a chart as an 
aid in this analysis; in this context the chart represents a continuum of 
"social value" 140 for verbal or pictorial material. At one end of this chart 
we find Hamlet, for example, and at the other, a sixty-minute motion 
picture entitled "Boy and Sheep," depicting a continuous closeup of the 
two principals engaged in their favorite pastoral pastime, the film devoid 
of dialogue or artistic embellishment. That seems about as far as I am 
willing to go on the pages of this journal.141 Thus, we begin with: 
138 Of course, commercial speech is now deemed to fall within the protection of the first 
amendment. See cases cited at note 44 supra. But a close reading of the commercial speech 
cases reveals that the extent of the protection granted is still substantially less than that 
granted most other types of speech. See Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First Amend-
ment: An Essay in Memory of Harry Canter, 64 Va. L. Rev. 263, 294-300 ( 1978). 
139 This is not to suggest that a state court could not decide to rework a particular balance 
of constitutional and non-constitutional interests, so long as the court did not formulate a 
new balance less protective of federal constitutional interests. See 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1592 
(1973). 
140 Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). 
141 More accurately, it is about as far as the editors are willing to go. A somewhat more 
graphic description was included in the original manuscript. 
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I Hamiel Boy and She~ I 
Now, the essential theory of the Supreme Court's opinion in Roth v. United 
States 142 is that at some point along this continuum of decrea,si_ng worth no 
ideas are being expressed; certain utterances are simply not considered 
speech. Therefore, our chart now takes on this form: 
Hamlet 
speech 
threshold Boy and Sheep 
Assuming that accepted constitutional doctrine prohibits the imposition of 
sanctions based upon the content of speech, 143 everything falling to the 
left of the speech threshold stands equal in the eyes of the law and 
receives full first amendment protection.144 Everything to the right re-
mains theoretically unprotected. If our ideal legal system were a reality, 
the actual line of constitutional privilege would be congruent with the 
theoretical speech threshold. But it must be recognized that the determi-
nation of what is or is not speech, is, like any judicial determination, 
subject to some degree of error; and, it should be recalled that the 
likelihood of a mistaken evaluation increases as we draw closer to the 
dividing line. 145 This recognition of inevitable imperfection coupled with 
the principle of comparative harm requires that we create a margin for 
error, and following Speiser and New York Times, the margin ought to be in 
favor of speech. In other words, the test for obscenity should lie some-
where to the right of the ideal speech threshold. Thus: 
... 354 u.s. 476 (1957). 
143 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.~. 205 (1975); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 
U.S. 92 (1972); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970).Butsee FCC v. Pacifica Found., 
98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978) (plurality opinion); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 
50 ( 1976) (plurality opinion). See generally Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First 
Amendment, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 20 (1975). 
144 But see FCC v. Pacifica Found., 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978) (upholding FCC regulation of 
"ind~ent" ~d!o broadcasts, although such broadcasts admittedly not obscene); Young v. 
Amencan Mtm Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976)_ (upholding zoning ordinance directed 
solely at theatres exhibiting films of a sexually explicit nature). These decisions are clearly 
exceptions to the general rule preventing government regulation based upon the content of 
src:ech. It is possible to fit the plurality opinion in Young into the analysis suggested in this 
article. See note 147 infra. Pacifica, though purporting to use a Young type analysis, is simply 
wrong. /d. · 
145 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). See notes 54-56 and accompanying text 
supra. 
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speech 
Hamlet threshold obscenity Boy and Sheep 
(A) (B) (C) 
Under this formulation, a buffer zone146 is created to counteract the 
fallibility of the legal process, to account for the potential hostility and 
prejudice of jurors and to compensate for the inherent difficulty of 
determining what is obscene. 147 
This final consideration-the intrinsic ambiguity of the governing prin-
ciple of obscenity-is responsible in large part for the creation of a 
chilling effect in this area. It will be recalled that in the New York Times 
case the Court never doubted the theoretical capability of a publisher to 
ascertain the truth of the factual assertions contained in any edition; 
rather, it was the cost of securing that truth which was deemed to be 
impermissibly high. 148 In the realm of obscenity, however, a different 
146 Amsterdam, Note, supra note 53, at 75 & n.40 (noting that doctrine of unconstitutional 
indefiniteness has been used to create an insulating buffer zone). 
147 In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976}. the Supreme Court 
upheld various city zoning ordinances that regulated the location of motion picture theaters 
exhibiting sexually explicit "adult" films. The ordinances prohibited the location of any adult 
theater within I 000 feet of any two other regulated uses or within 500 feet of a residential 
area. /d. at 52. Although I do not agree with the plurality opinion, it is possible to explain the 
Young decision in terms of the analysis proposed in this article. The "speech" subject to 
regulation in Young can be viewed as falling within Area B on the chart just introduced 
above. Since such speech is deemed to have little or no independent constitutional value, the 
danger of its regulation lies only in the possibility that Area A speech may be mistakenly 
penalized. While this is, of course, a legitimate concern, the type of ordinances involved in 
Young present little likelihood of such an occurrence. As the Court noted: 
The ordinances are not challenged on the ground that they impose a limit on the total 
number of adult theaters which may operate in the city of Detroit. There is no claim 
that distributors or exhibitors of adult films are denied access to the market or, con-
versely, that the viewing public is unable to satisfy its appetite for sexually explicit fare. 
Viewed as an entity, tll.e market for this commodity is essentially unrestrained. 
Id. at 62. 
Thus, the risk created by the Court's willingness to regulate Area B material in this case is 
somewhat negated by the nature of the regulation involved. A reasonable restriction limiting 
the location of theaters disseminating Area B material is unlikely to have a severe impact 
upon the availability of Area A material. 
However, there is a different and serious danger. Once the Court permits any regulation 
of Area B material, a real possibility exists that in a subsequent case a purported restriction 
of B material will, in fact, be a mistaken regulation of Area A work. Indeed, the recent 
decision in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 98 S. Ct. 3026 (I 978), upholding regulation of indecent 
and vulgar radio broadcasts of an admittedly non-obscene nature, represents just such a 
case. Although utilizing a ,Young type analysis, the Court in Pacifica erroneously equated the 
Area B content of the films regulated in Young with the "indecent" but nonetheless Area A 
material involved in the Pacifica broadcast. Such confusion is likely to be avoided if govern-
ment regulation remains focused solely upon the control of Area C material; if there is no 
regulation of Area B material there is virtually no risk that Area A material will be reached. 
Thus, perhaps Young is incorrect orily.because it increases the likelihood that decisions like 
Pacifica will be made. That latter case, on the other hand, is simply wrong. 
148 See notes 101-04 and accompanying text supra. 
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problem obtains. Justice Brennan has chided the Court for its "failure to 
define [obscenity] standards with predictable application to any given 
piece of material"; 149 indeed, he noted that any such standard would be 
"inevitably obscure." 150 Herein lies the problem. A legal principle so 
difficult of precise definition and proper application is bound to increase 
the uncertainty inherent in the legal process. Unlike our New York Times 
publisher, a handler of "adult" material will often be unable, even in 
theory, to make a definite determination as to the legal status of the 
materials that he places on the market. As one Justice commented: "The 
problem is ... that one cannot say with certainty that material is obscene, 
until at least five members of [the] Court ... have pronounced it so." 151 
Thus, the difficulty is not that the cost of making a theoretically possible 
determination is prohibitive, but rather, that the desired degree of cer-
tainty may, in fact, be unattainable at all,1 52 
The "inevitably obscure" standards which define obscenity do more 
than simply raise the level of uncertainty in an individual's own mind as to 
the lawfulness of his contemplated conduct. In addition, these standards, 
and the difficulty of their application by judge or juror, increase the 
likelihood of erro~ in the litigation process itself. Thus, a "merchant of 
materials for the mature" remains uncertain prior to taking action and 
after such action has been challenged; he entertains doubts concerning 
both the legality of his proposed conduct and the probability that such 
conduct will receive an error-free judicial evaluation. 
Returning to our chart, we find, then, that more than any other single 
factor, the inherent elusiveness of the concept of obscenity necessitates the 
creation of a margin for error to ensure the protection of speech falling to 
the left of the speech threshold. In the same manner that non-malicious 
factual falsehood received "strategic" protection in New York Times, Area B 
material here is safeguarded-protection is offered not because of the 
intrinsic worth of such material, but in order to guarantee that utterances 
that deserve the shield of the first amendment remain unscathed. If the 
legal test for obscenity incorporates sufficient precautions against the 
chilling of Area A material, it is again "double-counting" 153 to contend 
that regulations prohibiting obscenity are impermissibly broad simply 
because the vagueness of the concept leaves Area B material exposed to a 
potential chill. 
A glance at the Court's current definition of obscenity, enunciated in 
149 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 92 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
150 /d. See also L. Tribe, supra note 9, at 669 n.79 (citing authorities). . 
151 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 92 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
. 
102 One film distributor attempted to alleviate this uncertainty by requesting a declaratory 
Judgment that the film it proposed to distribute was not obscene. Noting that no prosecution · 
had. yet been threatened, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied the request, 
findmg no "actual controversy." Bunker Hill Distributing, Inc. v. District Atty., 78 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 2248 ( 1978). Questions of justiciability aside, such a procedure has obvious advantages. 
See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 55 & n.4 (1973). 
153 See text accompanying notes 128-32 supra. 
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the case of Miller v. California, 154 lends support to the validity of the 
foregoing analysis. 155 The Court, as a preliminary matter, limited the 
permissible scope of obscenity regulation to works depicting or describing 
sexual conduct and stressed that such conduct "must be specifically defined 
by the applicable state law." 156 This specificity requirement, which in its 
application has generally exceeded normal vagueness standards, reflects 
the Court's attempt to raise barriers impeding governmental efforts to 
have material adjudged obscene. Moreover, the formulation of the 
specific definition of obscenity in Miller incorporates three distinct tests 
which must be satisfied by the prosecution before a work will be con-
demned as falling outside the shelter of the first amendment. 157 Finally, 
the Court's caveat that only "hard-core" pornography will be subject to gov-
ernmental regulation 158 further indicates the Court's intention to create 
something of a "buffer zone" in Area B. 159 However, the recent erosion of 
the heightened specificity requirement, 160 the frequent willingness of the 
Court to consider for protection only works of "serious" value, and the 
possibility that "contemporary community standards" 161 may reflect a low 
tolerance for material of a sexual nature all serve to move the line of 
constitutional protection further to the left on our chart. By thus di-
minishing the margin for error, the risk of actually catching or just 
chilling Area A material is increased. Obviously, placing the Miller line at 
a particular point on the chart reflects a subjective judgment. But a 
proper analysis must at least recognize the existence of an Area B-to 
ignore it is to miss the point entirely. 
In New York Times, it will be remembered, the Court reinforced the 
buffer zone created by the "actual malice" requirement by demanding 
154 413 u.s. 15 (1973). 
155 The necessity of having to decide Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. !53 (f974) (reversing 
conviction for distribution of film "Carnal Knowledge"); indicates that the Miller test simplici-
ter was insufficient protection, since "Carnal Knowledge" falls clearly within Area A. There 
is, however, some question whether the early misinterpretations of the Miller test, most 
particularly the local standards concept, were due to the decision itself, or the manner in 
which it was reported to the public by the press. 
156 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) (emphasis added). See generally F. 
Schauer, The Law of Obscenity 154-68 (1976). 
157 The Court held: 
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average person, 
applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a 
wnole, appeals to the prurient interest ... ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in 
a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; 
and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value. 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 24. 
158 /d. at 27. Since Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. !53 (1974), there have been few prosecu-
tions or convictions in this country for the possession or distribution of material that is not 
extremely explicit. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(concluding that laws in this area are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography). See 
generally F. Schauer, supra note 156, at 109-13. 
159 See notes 145-47 and accompanying text supra. 
160 Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977). 
161 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 24. 
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that a plaintiff prove such malice with "convincing clarity."162 In the area 
of obscenity, the Court has similarly increased the protection inherent in 
the basic speech category by framing an important subsidiary rule imple-
menting obscenity adjudication. In Smith v. California, 163 the Court, for 
the first time, imposed a scienter requirement in criminal obscenity prose-
cutions.164 Although later decisions have indicated that the government 
need not prove that a defendant realized that a particular work was 
legally obscene, 165 Smith does require that the defendant be shown to have 
been aware of the nature and character of the materials. 166 The true basis 
for the Court's insistence that a scienter requirement be imposed is the 
recognition of the burden that would be thrust upon a bookseller subject 
to a strict liability standard. just as a publisher in the New York Times 
situation cannot be expected to make the theoretically possible determina-
tion of the absolute truth of his published statements, a bookseller like 
Mr. Smith, subject to prosecution for the possession of obscene material, 
cannot be expected to become personally familiar with every work con-
tained in his possibly enormous inventory. Even assuming that the stan-
dard of obscenity has some core meaning ascertainable by the average 
merchant of adult publications, it is nonetheless impermissible to subject 
that merchant to criminal liability for his unknowing possession of pro-
scribed material. The possibility that such liability might be imposed, 
coupled with the impracticality of requiring a bookseller to ascertain the 
contents . of every book held out for sale would no doubt increase a 
bookseller's uncertainty as to his potential vulnerability to a legal attack. 
This heightened uncertainty would cause an increase in that bookseller's 
oveJ?all fear of the lclgal system, leading naturally to an excess degree of 
caution on his part. 1 ~ 7 • The:imposition of a scienter requirement reduces 
this uncertainty; alleviates·this fear and hopefully diminishes the likeli-
hood that protected activ:ity, will be chilled. 
Not unexpectedly, this additional protection, supplementing the con-
stitutional buffer already created by the definition of obscenity itself, has 
its price. Professor Tribe's comment, that "[i]n the world of New York 
Times v. Sullivan, ignorance is bliss,"168 is equally applicable in the realm of 
obscenity. The ultimate effect of the Smith decision is that some books that 
are in fact legally obscene remain untouchable. The added burden of the 
scienter requirement serves the same purpose as did the raising of the 
162 See notes 107-13 and accompanying text supra. 
163 361 u.s. 147 (1959). 
164 See generally F. Schauer, supra note 156, at 222-26. 
165 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 119-24 (1974); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 
502, 510-11 (1966). 
166 See note 164; L. Tribe, supra note 9, at 665. 
167 See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959). Justice Brennan feared that a 
bookseller would restrict his sales to those materials that he had personally inspected. Note 
that the Court in Smith distinguished the food and drug laws, where there seems little harm 
in excess caution. /d. at 152. To the extent that there is a harm to financial interests as a 
result of this excess caution, it is certainly not a harm of a constitutional dimension. 
166 L. Tribe, supra note 9, at 638. 
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plaintiff's burden of proof in New York Times; here, however, rather than 
increasing the necessary quantum of proof, the Court has introduced an 
additional factor to be proved, and the introduction of this factor will 
allow certain material clearly within the grasp of the Miller test to "es-
cape." Unable to prove the required "scienter," the prosecution will fail in 
cases where it ideally should not; and in some instances, the government 
may decide to forego prosecution altogether. While the absence of a 
scienter requirement chills the distribution of protected materials because 
of the excess caution occasioned by practical uncertainty, the imposition 
of such a requirement chills the effective regulation of some unpro-
tected and therefore unlawful material. But the principle of comparative 
harm, flavored by the existence of the first amendment, demands that 
scienter be proved;. this is so even though the existence of that require-
ment protects the undeserving and in spite of the fact that the elimination 
of such a requirement might be constitutionally countenanced in the 
absence of the superior value. 169 
It has been suggested that the incorporation of local community stan-
dards into the constitutional definition of obscenity170 may increase the 
uncertainty inherent in the legal process in much the same manner as did 
the lack of a scienter requirement. It is not that the dealer of adult 
material is theoretically unable to determine the variety of obscenity 
'standards existing nationwide, but rather that the impracticability of mak-
ing such a determination throws the dealer into a perpetual sta~e of fear. 
He may be deterred from distributing what is in fact protected material 
by his doubt as to how that material will be evaluated in a particular 
locale; at the very least, the distributor will most likely bow to the strong 
pressure to conform to the "lowest common denominator of sexual accep-
tability."171 In this manner, many works which would receive protection, 
perhaps even in a majority of forums, remain uncirculated. In addition, it 
has been urged that the conviction of a publisher under the local commu-
nity standards of, say, Nebraska may in actuality drive that pu~lisher out 
of business and effectively bar his distribution of material that would 
receive protection under the local standards of say, Oregon.172 
The above arguments are, at first glance, rather appealing and fit nicely 
into an analysis of the chilling effect doctrine. Assuming that there are an 
incredible number of different local standards,173 and that the variations 
169 See note 167 supra. 
170 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 
(1977); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974). See generally F. Schauer, supra note 156, at 
116-35. 
17 1 L. Tribe, supra note 9, at 665. 
172 This argument has appeared recently in connection with several trials involving na-
tional distributors of sexually explicit magazines and motion pictures. There are no reported 
opinions, but for factual accounts, see Morgan, United States Versus the Princes of Porn, 
N.Y. Tilnes, Mar. 6, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 16; Neville, Has the First Amendment Met Its 
Match?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 18; First Amendment Hustle, Nation, 
Jan. 29, 1977, at 99 (discussing trial of Hustler Magazine publishers). 
173 See Schauer, Obscenity and the Conflict of Laws, 77 W.Va. L. Rev. 377, 387 (1975). 
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in these standards actually affect the outcome of obscenity litigation/ 74 
one may rationally predict an increased uncertainty on the part of a 
nationwide distributor or publisher whose inability accurately to ascertain 
the myriad variations in local law would ultimately create a heightened 
sense of caution with the resultant chilling of protected activity. I have 
elsewhere argued that community standards, whether local or national, 
may be functionally and theoretically irrelevant in obscenity litigation; 175 
but if these standards are to be applied, it does not necessarily follow that 
chilling effect reasoning is any more applicable in this context than it is to 
obscenity law in general. 176 Given that obscenity may be regulated,177 
there is always the possibility in our federal system that conduct lawful in 
one jurisdiction may be penalized in another. 178 The chilling effect doc-
trine is relevant to the local standards concept only to the extent that the 
variation in legal standards increases the degree of uncertainty already 
inherent in the legal process: If "local standards" were synonymous with 
"statewide standards," a publisher would be forced to identify and ac-
quaint himself with fifty different regulatory norms; this would not seem 
an excessive burden to impose upon a publisher or distributor operating 
on a national scale. But, if, as some have suggested, "each jury, in each 
town and city, may ... be a law unto itself," 179 it would appear that the 
uncertainty is incapable of cure, the degree of chill unconstitutionally 
extreme. It should be recalled that as long as certain utterances are 
deemed to fall outside the shelter of the first amendment, there will 
always be an unavoidable chilling, to an unspecified extent, of speech 
which is deserving of protection. What makes a chilling effect unaccept-
able is not simply the risk inherent in the enforcement and litigation 
process, but the aggravation of that risk by substantive rules that increase 
the amount of uncertainty to an intolerable degree. 
C. Incitement, Advocacy and the Brandenburg Test 
Justice Holmes' now familiar comment that "[e]very idea is an incite-
ment"180 would appear to doom to failure any judicial attempt to draw a 
clear line distinguishing words that are "keys of persuasion"181 from those 
considered "triggers of action." 182 Yet if it is accepted that the first 
amendment is not an absolute, 183 and recognized that certain words by 
174 This is by no means a certain proposition, since the degree of local discretion is rather 
narrow. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974). 
175 See Schauer, supra note 26, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 
176 See text accompanying notes 139-69 supra. 
177 See note 26 supra. 
178 See Schauer, supra note 26, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 
179 L. Tribe, supra note 9, at 664. 
180 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
181 Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 
1917), quoted in L. Tribe, supra note 9, at 615. 
182 Id. 
183 But see A. Meikeljohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-government ( 1948); Meikel-
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their very utterance may constitute a direct incitement to illegal action, the 
need for such judicial line drawing becomes apparent. The analysis earlier 
proposed during the discussion of the Court's work in the areas of 
defamation and obscenity may be successfully adapted so as to lend 
insight into the Court's attempt to delineate discrete categories of "pro-
tected discussion" and "unprotected incitements."184 While the analogy to 
the defamation and obscenity analysis is not exact, and although the 
reader may have already been sufficiently bombarded with pictorial assis-
tance, I again propose the use of a diagram to aid in this analysis. At the 
extreme left we find the peaceful discussion of orderly political change, 
with no suggestion by the speaker that such change will be effectuated in 
any manner save through the democratic processes. This is the type of 
speech that most probably lies at the core of the first amendment. At the 
right extreme, we have words that contribute nothing to political 
dialogue, that stimulate no reflection or serious thought on the part of the 
listener; these utterances trigger action without any possibility of a rea-
soned response. 185 Perhaps Holmes' example of falsely shouting fire in a 






The Court grappled for years with different variations and applications 
of the classic "clear and present danger" test in an attempt to determine 
where, between the two extremes presented above, the line of constitu-
tional protection should be drawn. In Dennis v. United States, 187 for exam-
ple, Chief Justice Vinson adopted Judge Learned Hand's formulation of 
the test: "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' 
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is 
necessary to avoid the danger." 188 But in the period following Dennis, the 
"Court tended to recast clear and present ·danger analysis from an exer-
cise in assessing likely consequences along a continuum, to an exercise in 
characterizing an act as either 'in' or 'out' of a defined category of unpro-
tected incitements." 189 Thus, in Yates v. United States, 190 the Court, speak-
john, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 196!" Sup. Ct. Rev. 245; Meikeljohn, What Does 
the First Amendment Mean?, 29 U. Chi. L Rev. 461 (1953). 
184 L. Tribe, supra note 9, at 615. 
183 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J, concurring) ("If 
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by 
the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence"). 
186 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
187 341 u.s. 494 (1951). 
188 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. at 510 (quotingUnited States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 
201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)). 
189 L. Tribe, supra note 9, at 615. 
!DO 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
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ing through Mr. Justice Harlan, construed the language of the Smith Act 
as embracing the traditional distinction between advo<;acy of abstract 
doctrine and advocacy of action-i.e., incitement. 191 Although the Yates 
Court admittedly decided the issue not "in terms of constitutional com-
pulsion" but, rather, in recognition of its "duty ... to construe [the] 
statute," 192 Justice Harlan clearly sought to perform this duty in confor-
mance with the requirements of the first amendment. 193 The advocacy-
incitement distinction, then, would appear to mark the boundary separat-
ing speech sheltered by the first amendment from those utterances which 
receive no constitutional protection. If the Yates line is added to the 







With our utopian legal system functioning smoothly, we find no instances 
where penalties are mistakenly imposed upon individuals operating to the 
left of the Yates line; similarly, all individuals bold enough to cross to the 
right of that boundary need entertain no doubt as to the swift and 
efficient imposition of legal sanctions punishing their unlawful conduct. 
Yates draws the ideal line, perfectly adequate in an ideal world. · 
But, the only true certainty in our legal system is the certainty of error. 
The Yates distinction, "often subtle and difficult to grasp," 194 is one particu-
larly susceptible to erroneous application-the heated discussion of politi-
cal doctrine often blends imperceptibly into the forceful advocacy of 
illegal action. And, as the likelihood of error is great, so is the harm 
generated by such an error. The lawful advocacy of ideas is often most 
effective when it approaches incitement; to punish mistakenly a speaker 
for exhortations falling just to the left of the Yates line is to suppress 
protected speech at the point where it may have the greatest impact. 
Moreover, the probability of error increases as we draw near to that legal 
line dividing the punishable and the protected. Again, a margin for error 
is needed, and, at the risk of sounding repetitive, this margin must be 
drawn in favor of speech. 
A reading of the Court's per curiam opinion in Brandenburg v. Ohio 195 
indicates that just such a "buffer zone" has, in fact, been provided. In that 
case the Court, in striking down Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act as 
unconstitutionally overbroad, held that 
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not 
191 /d. at 320. See generally L. Tribe, supra note 9, at 615; Comment, Brandenburg v. Ohio: A 
Speech Test For All Seasons?, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 151, 155 (1975). 
192 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. at 319. 
193 Comment, supra note 191, at 155 n.22. 
194 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. at 326. 
195 395 U.S. 444 ( 1969) (per curiam). 
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permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or 
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action. 196 
The two prongs of the Brandenburg test add a measure of overprotection, 
in the tradition of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 191 and the various obscen-
ity decisions previously discussed. 198 Consider the first component of the 
Brandenburg standard-that the utterances in question be directed at in-
citement or the production of immediate unlawful behavior. A rule hold-
ing a "soapboxer" responsible for the ultimate effect of his speech, re-
gardless of intent, would subject that speaker to strict liability for the 
hostile reactions of his audience. 199 Just as it was impermissible to expect a 
publisher to verify the truth of all his published factual statements and 
unreasonable to require a bookseller to familiarize himself with the con-
tents of each book in his inventory, it is impracticable, if not impossible, to 
force a speaker to predict the possible violent reaction of his often large 
and diverse audience. And beyond this, "a function of free speech under 
our system of government is to invite dispute." 20° Knowing that he may be 
held liable in the event that this invitation is accepted, a speaker may 
forego speaking entirely or, at the very least, temper his remarks to the 
point of negating their very effectiveness. To prevent this harm, the 
Brandenburg Court included an intent requirement; and, as we now have 
come to expect, the price exacted by the imposition of this requirement is 
the acceptance of the "escape" of the "guilty" ·in those instances where the 
government is unable to prove the intent that, in fact, does exist. 
But the Court in Brandenburg felt that a further measure of protection, 
supplementing the intent requirement just discussed, was needed to 
safeguard sufficiently lawful advocacy. Before utterances which are, in 
fact, directed to incitiQg imminent lawless action will be deemed to have 
forfeited constitutional protection, it must also be shown that these utter-
ances are likely to produce such action. A brief comparison with the 
Court's work in the area of obscenity points out the significance of this 
additional requirement. In order to have a particular work adjudged 
obscene, the prosecution need only focus upon the content of that work; 
no inquiry is directed towards the ultimate effect which the circulation of 
the material may have. Once it is demonstrated that a book or film fits 
within the definition of obscenity announced in Miller v. California 201 the 
prosecution's task is complete; there need be no showing of any "clear and 
present danger" or imminent lawless activity. But the Court is more 
protective when political advocacy is on the line. The second prong of the 
196 /d. at 447 (emphasis added). 
197 See notes 90-139 and accompanying text supra. 
198 See notes 139-80 and accompanying text supra. 
199 For an example of a decision holding a speaker liable for the response of his audience, 
see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). 
200 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I, 4 (1949). 
201 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See generally notes 154-62 and accompanying text supra. 
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Brandenburg test permits certain utterances of an admittedly inflammatory 
nature to remain untouched. The most ardent attempt to incite will not 
shed constitutional immunity unless it is demonstrated that the attempt 
was _likely to succeed. Under Brandenburg, then, a speaker is protected 
whether his effort to incite meets an apathetic response or whether his 
attempt at peaceful persuasion ends in violence. Translating this measure 










Once again, Area B speech receives a measure of strategic protection. 
This "margin for error" does not, however, reflect the intrinsic value of 
such speech.202 Rather, this approach recognizes that drawing the line any 
further to the left creates an unacceptable risk that Area A material will 
erroneously be penalized. The distinction between advocacy and incite-
ment is indeed too subtle, and the mistaken punishment of lawful political 
discourse too harmful to allow the placing of the legal line where it ideally 
should be drawn. The inevitability of error, and our preference for error 
made in favor of free speech, mandate that we embrace "a strategy that 
requires that speech be overprotected in order to assure that it is not 
underprotected."203 And consistent with its approach in the areas of 
defamation and obscenity, the Court in Brandenburg again formulated a 
substantive rule reflecting its acceptance of that strategy. 
IV. THE DocTRINE OF PRIOR RESTRAINT REVISITED 
A full appreciation and understanding of the principles underlying the 
chilling effect concept substantially undercut the rationale supporting a 
distinct constitutional doctrine of prior restraint that focuses upon the 
timing rather than the substance of governmental regulation of speech. 
Although regulation through prior restraint may take a variety of 
forms, 204 in every case the primary aim of such regulation is prevention, 
202 If it is argued that everything in Area B is, in fact, valuable, and not just protected for 
strategic reasons, then there is something wrong with the Brandenlmrg test. If we desire to 
grant protection to all utterances falling within Area B, it is necessary to push the actual legal 
test to the right of the right boundary of Area B. Recall that if the actual legal test is 
congruent with the limits of ideal protection, then as soon as we leave the world of absolutely 
accurate adjudication we will make -the.exact type of error that our rule is designed to avoid. 
203 Kalven, supra note 91, at 213 (discussing the rule of the New York Times case). 
204 The most traditional form of prior restraint is a licensing system, where all communi-
cations must be offered for advance approval by the censor or licensing body. This type of 
censorship has been employed to control the distribution of motion pictures. See, e.g., 
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 
43 (1961). Where such a system obtains, publication without advance submission and ap-
proval is an independent offense without regard to the contents of the publication. See, e.g., 
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not punishment. The accomplishment of this preventive goal through 
pre-publication governmental interference with speech-related activity 
will generally be constitutionally countenanced only if the state is able to 
clear an unusually high hurdle of justification205-the nature o~ the 
government restriction is assumed to require the imposition of additional 
safeguards. However, an analysis of this assumption, performed against 
the backdrop of the chilling effect doctrine, reveals that the view holding 
prior restraints as particularly pernicious, a view inherited from Milton206 
and Blackstone,207 is at best questionable. 
It is true that an initial look at the common characteristics of the various 
systems of prior restraint would appear to justify our apprehension of 
pre-publication prevention. These fears seem particularly acute where, as 
is frequently the case, the censoring body is an administrative board or 
licensing body rather than a judicial t~ibunal confronted with an injunc-
tion request. Generally, censorship bodies are vested with a large amount 
of broad and often unchecked discretion; 208 in addition, the standards 
applied by the censor are frequently vague and loosely defined, inviting 
suppression based upon personal animosity and prejudice. Moreover, 
censorship and licensing authority is rarely placed in the hands of lawyers 
or judges; consequently, decisions are often framed in response to politi-
cal pressure and reflect a lack of understanding of applicable legal stan-
dards and a lack of sensitivity to minority views. Censorship bodies may 
also have a vested interest in prohibiting the dissemination of some mate-
rial, an interest unrelated to the effectuation of any valid governmental 
purpose. Censors are in business to censor. 209 The licensor's compulsion 
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (holding municipal parade licensing 
ordinance unconstitutional). 
A different form of prior restraint exists where there is no requirement for advance 
submittal, but all publications found to be outside of the protected range will be banned and 
future distribution will be prohibited. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
The third significant form of prior restraint is the judicial injunction, prohibiting specific 
persons from publishing particular material; a violation of such an injunction is punishable 
by contempt sanctions. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New 
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); Walker v. Birmingham, 
388 U.S. 307 ( 1967). See generally Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 
1481 (1970). 
205 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); 
Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
206 Milton's objections were solely to licensing. He supported subsequent punishment if 
books were found harmful.]. Milton, Areopagitica 48, 136 u.c. Suffolk ed. 1968). 
207 The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state: but this 
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from 
censure for crimmal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to 
lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom 
of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take 
the consequence of his own temerity. 
IV W. Blackstone, Commentaries *151-52. 
20
" See generally Emerson, supra note 72. 
209 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965) (invalidating state motion picture 
1978] FIRST AMENDMENT -THE CHILLING EFFECT 727 
to justify and exercise his power will often lead to an aggressive and 
overly expansive use of that power. And since licensing procedures are 
rarely subject to public scrutiny, any abuse or misuse of authority will 
most likely go unnoticed and unpublicized. In addition, violation of a 
suppression order involves almost certain punishment since it is directed 
at a particular individual and a specific act. Subsequent punishment, on 
the other hand, may often be far less restrictive. Finally, there is one 
further characteristic of any system of prior restraint that is often cited as 
the principal justification for greeting such systems with open hostility.: 
unlike subsequent punishment, a prior restraint totally prevents certain 
material from ever reaching the public's eye. As Alexander Bickel com-
mented: "A criminal statute chills, prior restraint freezes." 210 
Now, it must be understood that the very existence of any sanction, 
prior or subsequent, means that some utterances fall outside the shelter of 
the first amendment-in every area of free speech lines are drawn 
separating the protected from the unprotected. Given the primacy of the 
principle of free speech, the overriding goal is to minimize the suppres-
sion of those utterances that have not, in fact, shed constitutional pro-
tection. And once this is isolated as the real issue, the distinct doctrine of 
. prior restraint begins to break down. 
'',.It may be that the description presented above does lend support to the 
view ·that prior restraints are particularly damaging to first amendment 
freedoms. Perhaps the dangers of oversuppression are increased when 
the censor sits. However, the defects alleged have little, if anything, to do 
with the timing of the government regulation. Unchecked discretion, 
vague standards and incompetent administration, while frequently asso-
ciated with the system of prior restraint, can just as easily exist in a system 
of subsequent punishment. If the flaws inherent in any prior restraint 
scheme do lead to frequent instances of mistaken suppression of pro-
tected material, the fault lies in the applicable rules and procedures211-
censorship statute for failure to provide adequate procedures to safeguard first amendment 
interests). · 
210 A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 61 (1975). 
211 In Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), the Court elaborated the manner in 
which administrative censorship could be effectuated within constitutional limits. The case 
w~s ~oncerned with a state motion picture licensing statute; in adjudging the statute uncon-
stitutional, the Court stressed that such regulation would be held valid "only if it takes place 
under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system." /d. at 
58. The Court indicated that two principal safeguards would be required. First, the burden 
of proving that the work is unproteCLed must be shouldered by the censor; this prong of the 
Freedman test strongly resembles the corrective measure in Speiser. See notes 74-90 and 
accompanying text supra. In addition, the Freedman Court insisted that there be a prompt 
judicial review of any censorship order. It noted that 
because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the neces-
sary sensltlvlty to treedom ot expressiOn, only a procedure requiring a judicial determi-
nau~m .suffices to impose a vahd final restraint. ... Moreover, ... even after the 
exp•rapon. of a temporary re~traint, an administrative refusal to license, signifying the 
cen~o_r s v1ew that the film IS unprotected, may have a discouraging effect on the 
exh1b1tor .... Therefore, the procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial 
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timing is a largely irrelevant factor. 212 Thus, it is not the temporal quality 
of the restraint but the identity and discretion of the restrainers that is 
important. 213 
Indeed it is possible that a well-designed and fairly administered system 
of prior restraint, operating under clearly defined and precise guidelines, 
might more closely resemble the utopian system suggested earlier than 
the more common system of subsequent punishment. Consider, for ex-
ample, a statute that imposes a five-year prison term for the distribution 
of obscene motion pictures,214 and assume that lengthy sentences are 
meted out with regularity. A distributor aware of the vigorous enforce-
ment of that statute will, for reasons previously discussed, 215 operate 
under a considerable amount of uncertainty. This uncertainty will lead to 
caution, and, particularly where borderline material is involved, to self-
censorship. Thus, the existence of the criminal penalty effectively freezes a 
certain amount of protected activity. Where subsequent punishment is the 
rule, borderline materials may never see the light of day. Recognizing 
this, we afford a measure of strategic protection to speech that ideally 
ought not be protected. In a sense, we relocate the borderline to ensure 
that any marginal material that is withheld by the overcautious is, in fact, 
material of little or no social value. The societal cost of this relocation is 
obvious: the extension of constitutional protection to the "undeserving." 
Under a system of prior restraint, however, the need for such a margin 
for error may be significantly diminished. It was earlier explained that a 
great degree of risk, uncertainty and deterrence result from the inability 
of an individual to ascertain accurately whether his contemplated conduct 
is governed by a particular regulating rule. In addition, it was suggested 
de~ision, to minimize the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of 
a hcense. 
380 U.S. at 58-59. 
212 In one important sense, timing may be a critical factor to be considered in the 
evaluation of the detrimental effect of any system of prior restraint. As Alexander Bickel 
noted: 
Prior ~estraints. fall on speech with a brutality and a finality all their own. Even if they 
are ulumately hfted th~Y. cause irreme<~:iable loss-:-a loss in the immediacy, the impact, 
of speech .... Indeed It IS the hypothesis of the F1rst Amendment that injury is inflicted 
on our soaety when we stltle the 1mmed1acy ot speech. 
A. Bickel, supra note 210, at 61. 
213
• This anomaly is presented in starkest relief in the Pentagon Papers case. There was no 
question of the suppression of future or unidentified publications. All of the materials at 
issue. ~ere _in fact before the courts. And the initial i~junction was issued not by an 
admm1strat1ve body, but by a court after a full adversary hearing. The materials were 
eval~ate_d by courts at three levels, all as competent as any body to evaluate the legality of the 
pubhcauons. If the Pentagon Papers should have been published, it was the general princi-
ples of freedom of speech and freedom of the press and not the prior restraint doctrine that 
commanded the result. See Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case 
of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 271, 278 (1971); Junger, Down Memory Lane: 
The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 23 Case West. Res. L. Rev. 3, 16-17 (1971); Kalven, 
Foreword: Even When a Nation Is at War, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 3, 31-34 (1971). 
214 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1462, 1465 (1976). 
215 See text accompanying notes 46-73 supra. 
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that an individual's risk-aversion may be an important factor influencing 
his decision whether to proceed with publication or distribution. Under a 
system of prior restraint, these "uncertainty-generating agents" are 'no 
longer operative. When some form of advance determination is possible, 
there is no risk in submitting even the closest cases to the licensor. Thus, 
materials that are, in fact, protected, but not clearly so, are more likely to 
emerge under a system of prior restraint than under a subsequent pun-
ishment mechanism. And, as a result, the buffer zone generally required 
when after-the-fact penalization is involved may, theoretically, be re-
duced. Such a margin for error need only reflect the imperfection inevi-
tably inherent in the process itself; there is no longer a need to compen-
sate for individual uncertainty and timidity. 
Those most hostile to prior restraints find support for their position by 
emphasizing that under a system of subsequent punishment material will 
surface at least once. In addition, it is stressed that under a prior restraint 
scheme there exists an absolute certainty of punishment. It is of course 
not true that all material will surface at least once where subsequent 
punishment is the rule. The message embodied in the chilling effect 
doctrine demonstrates that the .deterrence caused by a scheme of subse-
quent punishment may result in prevention to the same extent as does a 
licensing system. But even if some material that would be prohibited by a 
licensing scheme will emerge under a punishment system, what is the 
value of this? Assuming that the rules and procedures applied by a licens-
ing board pass constitutional muster, there would appear to be little social 
utility in allowing the publication and distribution of those materials that 
have been found to fall outside the law and outside the protection of the 
first amendment. If someone feels that the importance of what they have 
to say justifies the violation of the law, they can as easily ignore a prior 
restraint as a criminal statute. 216 To be sure, the probability of punish-
ment is higher in the former instance. But what is the independent value 
of protecting the unprotected? I fail to see how a legal principle can be 
based upon the value of protecting civil disobedience. 217 
Professor Freund once remarked that "[t)he generalization that prior 
restraint is particularly obnoxious in civil liberties cases must yield to more 
particularistic analysis." 218 He felt that a blind reaction to the invocation 
of the phrase "prior restraint" must yield to "a pragmatic assessment of its 
operation in the particular circumstances."219 The prior restraint doctrine 
has focused too keenly upon the temporal quality of the restraint, direct-
ing insufficient attention towards the true defects in the mechanism. It is 
true that a scheme of prior restraint may involve risks of excess suppres-
216 See 0. Fiss, Injunctions 154-55 (1972). 
217 And I remain unpersuaded by Professor Dworkin's argument to the contrary. See R. 
Dworkin, supra note 35, at 206-22. 
218 Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 533, 539 (I95I). 
219 /d. 
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sion of protected speech. But an appreciation of the chilling effect con-
cept reveals that such underprotection can accompany any form of legal 
sanction; the chilling effect directs us away from frequently irrelevant 
issues of timing and forces us to confront the real issues involved.220 
V. Is A BEHAVIORAL JusTIFICATION NECESSARY? 
The introduction of chilling effect reasoning and analysis was greeted 
with considerable judicial skepticism.221 While the chilling effect concept 
appears to be premised upon predictions or assumptions about human 
behavior, no evidence has been proffered to justify those predictions. It 
has not been clearly established that individuals are mistakenly deterred 
or become overly cautious as a result of the existence of particular stat-
utes, rules, or regulations.222 Yet it surely is not to be expected that courts 
will always abstain from making or accepting assumptions about human 
behavior; behavior is, after all, that with which the law is fundamentally 
concerned. Courts cannot completely ignore psych'ology, sociology, or 
other disciplines geared toward the study of human activity. The legiti-
mate objection arises when a court embraces a predictive position that is 
based upon scientific or technical theory. beyond the ken of the judges 
involved in the process of prediction. The problem is most acute when 
those not trained in a particular discipline attempt to choose from com-
peting views espoused by those who are.223 Thus, if it can be demon-
strated that the assumptions underlying the chilling effect doctrine are 
not based upon questionable experimental evidence or unresolved-scien-
tific conflict, the traditional objections to the use of chilling effect reason-
ing can be silenced. 1 · • ·,; · ·1 · 
This task does not appear insurmountable if we emphasize the com-
parative aspects of the chilling effect doctrine rather than specific, and 
most likely unprovable, predictions of human behavior. We need make 
only two broad and seemingly safe assumptions: first, that the legal system 
is far from perfect, its only certainty the certainty of error; and second, 
22
° Consider Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). From the point of view 
~f t_he newspaper involved, this case _can hardly be viewed as one chieAy concerned with the 
ummg of the governmental regulation. It is doubtful that the press would be any more 
~ece~tive towards a criminal statute subjecting pu.blishers; editors and writers to a year's 
1mpnsonment for publishing any material about a pending criminal prosecution. The objec-
tion to the type of restriction involved in Nebraska Press is to the substance of the restraint, 
not to the fact that an injunction was utilized to carry it out. See generally Barnett, The Puzzle 
of Prior Restraint, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 539 (1977). 
221 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 
(1959). See generally Jahoda & Cook, Security Measures and Freedom of Thought: An 
Exploratory Study of the Impact of Loyalty and Security Programs, 61 Yale L.J. 295 (1952). 
222 For an attempt to identify specific instances of deterrence, see Anderson supra note 
112. • 
223 
'!"he objections, with which I do not agree, to the use of sociology by the Supreme 
Court m Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), seem primarily based upon the fact 
that there was no sociological opinion so clear-cut that judicial notice was warranted. See 
Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y. U.L. Rev. 150, 157-58 (1955); ·Honnold, Book Review, 33 Ind. 
L.J. 612, 614-15 (1958). 
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that individuals are risk-averse. As long as these general assumptions are 
acceptable, the chilling effect emerges not as a prediction, but simply as a 
method of looking at the first amendment. It is, at bottom, just a branch of 
decision theory. In a first amendment context, the imperfection of our 
legal system will lead to errors of overptotection and underprotection. 
Without involving ourselves at all with specific estimates of human behav-
ior, we find that the principle of comparative harm, as embraced by the 
Court in Speiser v. Randall, mandates that we err in favor of free speech. 
Legal rules must be designed so as to favot the overcautious rather than 
restrict the undercautious; in our imperfect system, we guess in favor of 
protection rather than non-protection. Now it is conceivable that convinc-
ing evidence might be introduced demonstrating that a substantial gov-
ernmental interest can be safeguarded only by restricting free speech to 
some extent-in some instances, the balance may go against speech.224 
But in the absence of such evidence, the "transcendent value" embodied 
in the first amendment means that the presumption is with speech. Behav-
ioral ignorance or imprecision must be resolved in favor of excess permis-
sion, not over-restriction. Thus, the chilling effect doctrine flows not from 
a specific behavioral state of the world, but from an understanding of the 
comparative nature of the errors that are bound to occur. By comparing 
rather than measuring, the behavioral imprecision of the chilling effect 
concept becomes irrelevant. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the reader is still asking, "So what?" The question deserves an 
answer, and I believe the answer is suggested by the paragraph at the 
end of the preceding section. The essence of the chilling effect is struc-
tural. It provides a way of looking at procedures, at rules and at institu-
tions. Although appellate courts have the technical obligation of reviewing 
all factual determinations of non-protection225-whether they be in defa-
mation, obscenity, or incitement-it is difficult to conceive of a system 
where the extent of protection is dependent upon case-by-case determina-
tion by the court sitting at the top of the judicial pyramid. As the first 
amendment comes to embrace new ground, the area of commercial 
speech being the most recent example,226 the Supreme Court's ability 
effectively to fulfill its obligation of factual review becomes less and less a 
realistic possibility. 227 The vitality of first amendment protection thus rests 
• 
224 The notion that there must be strong and specific evidence to rebut the presumption 
m favor of speech is really the underlying premise of the "clear and present danger" test. 
2 ~ 5 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 189-90 (1964) (opinion of Brennan, j.); Roth v. 
Umted States, 354 U.S. 476,497-98 (1957) (Harlan,]., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
226 See cases cited at note 44 supra. See also note 69 supra. 
227 For example, one would hardly expect the Supreme Court to review the contents ot 
each ~~gistration statement filed under the Securities Act of 1933 which is found by the 
Secunues and Exchange Commission to be false or misleading. 
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more on the substantive and procedural rules employed below than on 
the appellate review of the findings made under those rules. 
With the rulemaking process preeminent, the importance of the chilling 
effect emerges clearly: the chilling effect doctrine embraces the principles 
that most plainly affect what the rules must be and determines what 
procedures are necessary for the application of those rules. It is the 
ever-present guide for the formulation of first amendment theory appli-
cable in a system characterized by uncertainty and fallibility. The chilling 
effect is but a principled distortion of "ideal" rules-since our legal system 
does not include ideal jurors, judges, or citizens, the attempted applica-
tion of the ideal rule to the non-ideal reality is itself a distortion. The two 
basic principles underlying the chilling effect doctrine allow us to recast 
those "ideal" rules in a conceptually sound manner. 
Tht: two principles are not complex. First, the chilling effect recognizes 
the fear that is caused by the inherent uncertainty in the legal system. It is 
not necessary to measure that uncertainty, but only to realize that it exists 
in all cases. What we must isolate are those factors that cause a significant 
increase in the degree of uncertainty and fear normally surrounding the 
legal process. The existence of this added uncertainty or increased fear 
enhances the possibility of an erroneous judicial determination and leads 
to the second component of the chilling effect doctrine: the rule of 
priority, or comparative harm. 
The chilling effect is premised upon the recognition of the first 
amendment as a preferred value. More than just an emotive observation, 
this recognition provides the analytical foundation for dealing with a legal 
system characterized by uncertainty. Admitting the inevitability of error, 
and expressing our preference for errors made in favor of free speech, 
we are forced to design rules and procedures that minimize the occur-
rence of the more harmful error, i.e:, the wrongful suppression of speech. 
This is the essence of the chilling effect. 
These principles are not, however, absolutes. Obviously one could 
eliminate all first amendment error by deeming every utterance pro-
tected, regardless of its potential harm. By so doing, we would minimize 
or eliminate the more harmful error, but at an unacceptable social cost, 
and with an unacceptable increase in the error of overprotection.228 Thus, 
the recognition of comparative harm and comparative error is fundamen-
tally a balancing process, but it is balancing at the rule-making level. 229 It 
is a principled way of incorporating nonconceptual chilling effect oratory 
into a definitional balancing approach.230 The final result is the conver-
sion of the chilling effect idea into a conceptual doctrine. The chilling 
effect concept has been around for some time, but it is not too late to 
recognize its true importance in first amendment adjudication. 
228 See note 112 supra. 
229 See Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's 
Balancing Test, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 755, 763-70 (1963). 
230 See generally Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment 
Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 935 (1968). 
